SITREP 8/11/24: Desperate for Escalation, Zelensky Bombs Zaporozhye Nuke Plant in Frustration

Aug 12, 2024

Today Zelensky’s forces appeared to bomb the Zaporozhye nuclear plant:

Russian sources says it was a Ukrainian drone that hit the Zaporizhzhia NPP.
At around 9:00 pm today, Ukrainian militants attacked the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant using a kamikaze drone.
Preliminary reports suggest the drone was launched from Nikopol in the Dnipropetrovsk region of Ukraine.
The drone operator appeared to have targeted the plant deliberately the Russian sources say.
Still unconfirmed until we see material indicating the cause of the fire

Zelensky of course blamed Russia, even though, interestingly, he stated Russians began “burning tires” to create the smoke, when even the IAEA above heard loud explosions, despite again being ordered by their masters not to directly name the culprit:

Reportedly some machinery inside one of the cooling towers was set ablaze, but the 6 reactors of Europe’s largest power plant have already been in ‘cold shutdown’ mode, and are said to be in no real danger…for now.

However, most significant to ongoing events is the correct analysis of why Zelensky would choose to strike the plant just now. It is obvious to us that it represents a terminal desperation from the AFU, which can only mean that their situation on the ground is in fact grinding to a culminating point, which answers one of the chief questions we’ve had about the ongoing Kursk adventure.

There was still some hesitation on my part on whether the Kursk madness was truly a sign of an AFU reaching its critical end point or not, though mostly I leaned on the affirmative. However, the latest desperate move seems to fully avow this interpretation of events. But, I believe there are a few multi-varied nuances to properly interpreting Zelensky’s threatening signal.

First: it can be said that this act of desperation was a strong signal to Zelensky’s own “partners” in the U.S. and the West. I predicted long ago—last year—that once things finally grind down to the gristle for Ukraine, Zelensky would have no choice but to begin threatening his partners through escalation to save his own hide. He would threaten not only pushing Russia’s red lines in unnerving ways which would pose the threat of nuclear annihilation to the U.S., but as a last ditch effort he would also float the threat of unveiling many secrets and ‘skeletons in the closet’ of his Western partners as blackmail.

But what’s happening now is in effect a double nuclear blackmail. Not only was Zelensky trying to reach the Kursk nuclear plant for this very purpose, but has now acted out his furious frustration at the ZNPP, as well. It’s difficult to know for certain, but captured AFU POWs have in fact now attested to the Kursk plant as being the objective, or Kurchatov, the town where the plant sits. This was supposed to have been reached in the first day or two, which now appears to have been a miserable failure being covered up by more antics.

But getting back to the second point. I believe the ZNPP strike was also a double threat toward Russia. ZNPP may be currently inactive, but Kursk is in operation, and Zelensky likely meant to send a symbolic message that the Kursk nuclear plant may be “next”. In essence, it is saying: “Be wary, the Kursk plant is in my sights. This is just the first demonstration of my seriousness.”

But why would Zelensky threaten his partners as well? The obvious answer is to shock them into providing more aid and committing totally to Ukraine’s victory. “Give us everything or we’ll take the entire world down with us in a ball of nuclear flame.” Funny how much similarity there is between Zelensky and Israel, what with their Samson Option and all.

—

The problem is that, more and more evidence is rolling out that not only is the Kursk offensive becoming a disaster, but that Zelensky sacrificed the Donbass front in order to pull this egregious stunt.

First we have a new Financial Times article which openly states that Ukrainian units were pulled from the Donbass front toward Kursk:

https://www.ft.com/content/7dcb3009-ec9a-417a-b2e1-01c26c9349a0

The ultimate aim of Ukraine’s incursion — which is using some of its best and most elite brigades — remains unclear. But the operation has demonstrated that Russia’s border defences are still weak more than a year after Ukraine’s first mini-incursion and has given Kyiv a much-needed morale boost.

It further confirms the negotiations angle:

Analysts have said Ukraine may be seeking to use the Kursk offensive to improve its position in potential talks. It is losing territory and men in eastern Ukraine and is still struggling to resolve ammunition and manpower shortages.

Then came a new Economist article which confirmed the same thing:

First they do a little shoe-shining to balance out the negative reportage, then they hit us with the truth:

“‘We sent our most combat-ready units to the weakest point on their border,’ says a general-staff source deployed to the region. ‘Conscript soldiers faced paratroopers and simply surrendered.’ But other aspects of the operation indicate a certain haste in preparation. All three soldiers quoted in this article were pulled, unrested, from under-pressure front lines in the east with barely a day’s notice.”

Most damningly for the AFU, they admit that Russia, on the other hand, hardly had to shift reserves from Donbass:

“Russia has shifted troops from the Kharkiv front, but so far it has moved far fewer from the vital Donbas front. ‘Their commanders aren’t idiots,’ says the Ukrainian general-staff source. ‘They are moving forces, but not as quickly as we would like. They know we can’t extend logistics 80 or 100 km.’”

In short: Ukraine pulled its most elite units from vital fronts to carry out Zelensky’s mad pageant, while Russia for the most part didn’t, which explains why the Pokrovsk and Chasov Yar directions continue falling for the AFU as we speak; reportedly, Russia used around 80% rear reserves, with just 20% of detachments pulled from other areas, mostly owing to them already being close by—i.e. the 810th Marines were pulled from Volchansk front because of its proximity and their readiness.

Here’s another deeper explanation from a Russian source:

How did the Ukrainian Armed Forces manage to accumulate a group of six, eight, ten (insert the appropriate) brigades?
There are three to five brigades + reinforcement units operating in the Kursk direction. Formally. In reality, there is reason to believe that the group is made up of a couple of more or less homogeneous brigades (like the 22nd Separate Mechanized Brigade) and heterogeneous battalion (and possibly company) combat groups, hastily transferred from other sections of the front before August 6. The abundance of soldiers from different units and subdivisions, as well as the abundance of heterogeneous equipment, creates the illusion of a huge group.
The same 41st Separate Mechanized Brigade ( mentioned by the Ministry of Defense in its report) is a pretty battered unit. First, it suffered losses near Chasovy Yar. Then it was transferred to a “quiet” area near Toretsk-New York. On July 21, elements of the 41st Separate Mechanized Brigade caught Iskanders at the Barvenkovo station, and now its elements are in the Kursk region. Not enough time has passed between July and early August to make up for the losses in men and equipment. The same can be said about the “anti-heroes” of the unsuccessful defense of Ocheretin — the 115th Separate Mechanized Brigade, as well as the repeatedly beaten 80th and 82nd Air Assault Brigade.
All this gives reason to say that a rapid transfer of brigade elements was carried out, which were unlikely to go into battle in full force.

In the very opening paragraph of the Economist article, they describe how Russian glide bomb’s slaughtered their units:

Note the mention of Sumy hospital in the last sentence. Here they develop that thought:

But the accounts from Ukraine’s wounded suggest it has not been a walk in the park, and remains risky. The hospital ward reeks of the sacrifice: soil, blood, and stale sweat. Foil burn-dressings line the corridor. In the yard, the patients, some wrapped like mummies from head to toe in bandages, smoke furiously. Angol, a 28-year-old paratrooper with the 33rd brigade, looks like a Christmas tree. His left arm is immobilised in a fixation device. Tubes, bags and wires protrude from his body. He was also about 30km into Russia when his luck ran out. He isn’t sure if it was artillery or a bomb that hit him. Maybe it was friendly fire; there was a lot of that. All he can remember is falling to the ground and shouting “300”, the code for wounded. The Russians had been on the run up to then, he insists, abandoning equipment and ammunition as fast as they could.

What’s most notable about this, is our best first-hand, on-the-ground source from the region corroborates every word. A popular TG commentator I’ve mentioned before lives in Sumy and reports on the goings on. He’s provably reliable as he’s the first person who began talking about “massive AFU troop movements” through the city of Sumy a full week before the Kursk incursion began. He now reports:

👉👉👉 Exclusive information from this channel:
Yesterday almost 1000 wounded soldiers, both Russian and Ukrainian were treated in Sumy's hospitals.
👉👉👉 Hospital admissions for wounded soldiers are now at almost 2000 in Sumy, even hospitals in Kharkov, Cherkassy and Kiev are being prepared. This includes both Russian and Ukrainian injured soldiers, however after the first batch of Russians, now most of the injured are Ukrainians.

So, there’s almost 2,000 mostly Ukrainian wounded flooding Sumy hospitals, with the “Russian” ones he mentions presumably being the dozens of captured POWs.

This is corroborated further by ongoing calls on Ukrainian channels for mass blood donation drives in Sumy:

Now, to be perfectly impartial for the sake of journalistic integrity, Ukrainian sources posted this alleged video of a Russian hospital worker complaining of a local hospital likewise being flooded with injuries:

However, I’ve tracked down a video of a real Kursk region hospital—perhaps even the one in question above—and it is by no means even remotely comparable to what is happening in Ukrainian Sumy hospitals vis-a-vis the killed and wounded flooding in.

Despite the fact that Ukraine has bloodied Russia a little bit, particularly via the HIMARS strike on a Russian reinforcement column, the losses continue to appear lopsided in Russia’s favor from everything I can see.

Getting back to the Economist article, they conclude by admitting it could be a Russian trap:

The source cautions against comparing the Kursk incursion to Ukraine’s successful swift recapture of much of Kharkiv province in late 2022. The Russian army is taking the war more seriously now, he says: “The danger is we’ll fall into a trap, and Russia will grind our teeth down.” On Sunday Russia’s defence ministry claimed, albeit not for the first time, that it had “thwarted” attempts by Ukrainian forces to break deeper into Russia

Now, more and more Western sources not only question the logic of this failing campaign, but even outright predict it leading to catastrophe for AFU.

Der Spiegel dropped this bombshell headline:

https://www.spiegel.de/ausland/russland-ukraine-krieg-militaerexperte-warnt-vor-ukrainischem-vorstoss-auf-russisches-gebiet-a-796f8e55-b102-4829-966e-99f3f8165c7e

And what does Spiegel believe is the ultimate point of this “invasion”?

Once again (excuse the wonky auto-translation):

Better translation:

Gressel: The Ukrainian leadership wants to create pressure for possible negotiations with Russia. For this it needs negotiating leverage, which it now wants to gain with quickly and cheaply occupied territory.

When asked for the worst-case scenario, here’s how they respond:

Gressel: In Germany, the Wagenknecht camp would gain popularity. Ukraine could come across as an unreliable go-getter. Berlin and Washington would reduce their support. The Kursk maneuver could herald the military end of Ukraine.

Other articles have poured out, citing the goal of ‘destabilizing Russia’:

And it’s true, every single step of the ‘offensive’ thus far has been fraught with various deep-fakes and psyops, like today’s phony deep-faked video of Konashenkov announcing that Chechen Akhmat forces ‘ran away’:

In fact, no such thing happened, as Chechen forces even released a video from the Kursk region showing their liquidation of a Ukrainian unit:

And this even more laughable deep-fake of Zakharova saying Russia is ready to give up the ZNPP in exchange for captured Russian territories in Kursk:

https://edition.cnn.com/2024/08/08/europe/ukraine-russia-incursion-analysis-intl-cmd/index.html

A pro-UA Estonian analyst remarks on the situation:

—

The biggest issue currently is that the much stronger than usual fog of war has allowed Western/pro-UA sources to completely confabulate various fake “advances” in the Kursk region. Virtually every new map from Western sources, whether ISW, the various articles posted above, etc., are currently completely phony. In fact, the AFU was driven out of every deep advance in the Kursk region, and now occupy only a small area around Sudzha.

All the earlier advances to as far as Komski Byki, Snagost, or Shagorovo have all been destroyed and pushed back. Russian reinforcements have created an impenetrable wall, and Ukrainian units are now digging in around Sudzha, desperately looking for a chink in Russia’s armor while being slowly destroyed by Russia’s growing aerial-drone dominance of the zone. Even Sudzha itself, which AFU proudly announced as having captured, is now in a kind of gray zone, with AFU certainly not controlling any part of the town, excluding the entrance stele in the northwest by which they took some TikTok photos.

Some videos from the area today:

Russian cluster attack on Ukrainian column:

Lancet strikes:

Here’s what the current frontline actually looks like, with the white circles representing how far Ukrainian DRGs initially pointlessly got by speeding past Russian defenses just to make it look like they were capturing territory—the red areas is where Russia has now retaken everything:

Russian military source update:

*️⃣ Kursk region . We are working on small enemy groups. There were small arms battles. Now we have cleared the nearest 6-7 kilometers.
They are trying to bypass the protected areas of the front and attack from the rear. The Ukrainian Armed Forces have started abandoning their combat equipment. They are running out of fuel, and we have already interrupted their supply of reserves. Their losses are serious. We continue to press.
The commander on site reports 🫡
Regiment named after Issa Pliev

Another quick overview explaining how Ukraine “captured” so much territory, when in reality it couldn’t hold any of it when Russian reinforcements came:

How did the Ukrainian Armed Forces manage to advance so quickly?
Several factors played a role: the abundance of wheeled vehicles, the priority of speed over consolidation, and the sparse combat formations of the Russian Armed Forces. Thus, Ukrainian units, bypassing resistance nodes, in some cases were able to slip through to a depth of 10-15 km in the first day. Another issue is that the mobile armored groups did not have sufficient weight, supplies, or survivability to hold the territory. As soon as the combat formations of the Russian Armed Forces were consolidated, the dashing runs on Ukrainian armored vehicles ceased. With the intensification of the work of UAV operators and army aviation, the ability to mass forces and armored vehicles disappeared. Now even individual armored vehicles are being hunted

- From the Kharkov operational direction (GV "North") - units of the Russian 138th separate motorized rifle brigade (SMRB), from the 6th combined arms army (OVA) - to the combined reinforced motorized rifle battalion (MSB), the 44th army corps (AK), apparently, from its 128th SMRB and 72nd MRDB, is moving to the Kursk direction, up to 3 battalions
- From the Kupyansk direction, probably the 272nd motorized rifle regiment (47th tank division\td), obviously, also "posted" one motorized rifle battalion
- Up to 2 airborne assault battalions (AAB) have already been recorded, this is "on top" of the parachute assault battalion (PAB) of the 217th parachute assault regiment (PAR) of the 98th airborne division (AAD), which was in the Kursk direction BEFORE the visit of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. They are probably from the 104th airborne assault division (AAD) of the Dnieper Guards, from the Dnieper direction.
There is also information about the movement to the Kursk direction of at least one battalion of marines (OB MP) from the 810th separate marine brigade (OB MP), but I somehow don’t believe it... most likely, this is a battalion from the 155th separate marine brigade, which had previously been deployed and operated in the Volchansk direction.
- The remaining troops (forces) of the first echelon will obviously be made up of units (BTGr) from the 64th and 38th separate motorized rifle brigades (OMSBR) of the 35th combined arms army of the GV "East"...
Thus, we can state...
- In essence, those same "reserves" that the Russians are now pulling into the Kursk operational direction in order to "cut off" the offensive of the Ukrainian Armed Forces represent a real "hodgepodge" (a set of very diverse forces and means, with very different actual levels of their combat capability), obviously hastily assembled.
How to "put all this together" and manage it in a separate operational direction, as they say in a situation "on the fly", with an obvious time deficit and "problems with monitoring the situation", is a big question... The Russian command attempted to "pull this trick" in a very similar situation in the Kharkov region, and it ended in obvious failure and the retreat of Russian troops from it...
- At the moment, the Russian command is acting in a completely understandable algorithm, solving two main tasks - "minimization" (containment) of the Ukrainian Armed Forces offensive on a scale (i.e. in its pace and scope), and trying to gain time for the operational deployment of additional forces and resources in a new operational direction, which, obviously, arose for the Russian command "out of plan" and suddenly...
- And finally, I have no reliable information that the enemy has begun to move any additional forces (reserves) to the Kursk region from key areas for itself - Kramatorsk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk or Kurakhovsk, where it is conducting an offensive... And this, obviously, looks quite eloquent...
But, in this context, I would like to note that the situation in the Kursk operational direction obviously has, so to speak, “significant potential”...
Probably, the Russian command will have to quickly deploy a second echelon of ADDITIONAL forces and resources (its reserves) in the Kursk operational direction (quite possibly within the framework of the GV "North"), because it is already obvious that the 10-11 battalions "hastily grabbed" in different directions and of different units and formations will not fundamentally solve the problem there...
In this regard, it will be very interesting to see who and what this "second echelon" will consist of

And here’s Starshe Eddy’s good overview of the current phase of the offensive:

1. It is clear to everyone that the offensive has been stopped for the moment. The enemy is twitching, trying to expand the bridgehead. According to the prisoners, apparently, their task was to really take Kurchatov. And this task was thwarted by the defense of conscripts and border guards in the city of Sudzha. Having an advantage in forces, means, and holding the initiative, the enemy could not take control of it for a long time.
2. It is clear that they are trying to expand the bridgehead and are introducing reserves. But, judging by the fact that their equipment has started to "dry up" [lack of fuel], and the initiative is fading away. This is one of the signs that a second strike can not be expected. That is, new major breakthroughs can not be expected. This does not mean at all that we need to fold our arms and shout "Hurray! We won!" No, but this is one of the markers that the enemy is running out of steam. They are digging in, it will be very difficult to dig them out of the Kursk soil. But how do military people look at this? The number of targets is a sea. For "lancetists", FPV-shniks - a sea of work, which means ours see them, and this is good. There will be a result. The enemy's equipment will be destroyed.
3. Should we expect raids from them in other directions? We should. They may well twitch. The fact that we are transferring forces and resources from one front to another shows once again that we do not have enough forces and resources to launch a large-scale offensive. And of course, we still need to make tougher and more solid decisions regarding the war, etc. Because it is very difficult to fight with such forces and resources.
4. Based on the results of this Ukrainian offensive near Kursk, we must now take the President's words as a basis and finally begin to form a buffer zone. We must stand in Sumy, Chernigov, at a minimum, encircle and then take Kharkov, otherwise we will have no peace day or night from this mad pig.

Just as we discussed last time, last night Ukrainian forces did attempt to probe at least two new directions on the Belgorod front, where I had mentioned forces were accumulating. Recall I had guessed they would go for Grayvoron area, because if you know tactics, it’s one of the few remaining viable areas—and voila, it’s roughly where they struck. They reportedly gathered up to 1 regiment with 100 pieces of mostly light equipment in Bohodukhiv, on the Ukrainian side just south of Grayvoron

They incurred both into Bezymeno, which you can see is right next to Grayvoron checkpoint:

Also into Poroz, on the other, northern side of Grayvoron:

As well as somewhere in the direction of Belaya, just south of Sudzha and north of Grayvoron:

Both of these attacks were beaten back by Russian forces. To use the Zaporozhye offensive as a parallel, the first raid into Sudzha and beyond was the main thrust out of Orekhov and Mala Tokmachka. Now, these secondary probes are equivalent to Ukraine’s initial probes around Vremevka ledge, down into Staromayorske, Urozhayne, etc.

So, for now their main axes have been blunted with a lot of losses and destroyed equipment, but they are supposedly still pulling up remaining reserves while reconnoitering any openings to make a secondary foray. Recall that in the Zaporozhye offensive they did eventually succeed in a couple of the secondary directions—for a while at least, so Russia is not fully out of danger yet. However, it’s looking increasingly favorable for the Russian side as Ukraine has already expended a lot of material for very little gain.

So while there is some danger that Ukraine could still make some advances, with each day that passes, it’s looking more and more unlikely. Russian reserves are being pulled up and while the AFU is digging in around Sudzha, this could spell their doom. That’s because Ukraine’s main success in the opening part of the operation relied on speed in total preference over consolidation of any terrain. Russian units were caught a bit flat-footed, many of which were merely “bypassed” by swift wheeled Ukrainian light vehicles.

But if Ukrainian chooses to dig in and transition the front into another artillery slug-fest, Russia will drown them in a sea of glide-bombs and massive artillery overmatch, destroying their static positions and turning it into another Khrynki-like bloodbath for the AFU. In fact, some have even suggested Putin may again “delay” their expulsion from the territory. I don’t think—as some others believe—it was a totally deliberate trap on the part of the Russian MOD, to lure the AFU into Kursk, but now that they’re here, Putin may take advantage of it by delaying their expulsion in order to openly grind up the AFU’s last remaining elite units, just like in Khrynki. After all, never interrupt your opponent when he’s making a grave mistake—if he presents an opportunity to defeat him at scale in a way that could accelerate the end of the war, then why not?

Don’t forget, the long-rumored “true offensive” was going to focus on the Zaporozhye plant in Energodar. Rezident-UA channel believes that could still be the play, with the Kursk as the first misdirection phase. Zelensky may have signaled such intentions by bombing ZNPP today, showing his obsession with the plant remains a primary focus.

Rezident UA:

#Inside
Our source in the General Staff said that the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Kursk direction involved 2 thousand military personnel, now they are waiting for additional reserves that are accumulating in Sumy. The new offensive campaign of the Ukrainian Army consists of several stages, the main blow will be focused on the Zaporizhzhya NPP, while the Armed Forces will carry several more distracting operations in Russia.

Ropcke at BILD:

« Ukraine will have to leave Russia ». The military analyst of the German newspaper Bild Julian Repke called for "not to be deceived" about the Kursk operation of the Armed Forces.

"Despite all the euphoria, I still do not understand the Ukrainian strategy. If you really have 5,000 fresh soldiers plus equipment, why not break through the Russian front in Kharkov, Lugansk, Donetsk or Zaporozhye? "He asks a question.

"Let's not fool ourselves. Of course, Ukraine will have to retreat from Russia. Maybe not immediately, but precisely in the context of peace negotiations and under international pressure. In this regard, the strategy of conquering the Russian region remains extremely risky. And we hope that this is only a distraction before the liberation of the south and east of Ukraine, "said Röpke.

—

By the way, a tertiary reason for Zelensky’s desperate dash into Kursk could be to deliberately nix negotiations, which much of the West is increasingly pushing on him. Just like his coeval of Netanyahu, Zelensky is trapped in an escalation spiral for survival, forced to continue the war at all costs to stave off his own loss of power, which would be followed by him being thrown to the wolves.

He likely believes that by forcing Russia’s hand via continuous flaunting of red lines, he could spark a NATO-Russia confrontation that would ensure the continuation of the conflict, and his clan’s political—and likely corporeal—survival.

Legitimny:
All our sources are sure that the Ukrainian crisis is now possible in the last phase, where Zelensky decided to put everything and go to the all-in. This means that the office people know that « the power reserve » they have little and it is necessary to raise rates, ending the game possible this year on the best conditions for themselves.

If Zelensky’s plan fails, then Ukraine will not exist in its even current territorial borders.

We are watching…

—

I’ll leave you with this last thoughtful reflection on the Kursk situation and ongoing events:

I hope that the escapade in Kursk Oblast will be the swan song of Zelensky's regime, and after the failure there, he will have no opportunity to repeat something similar. This story is the quintessence of the political style of the Ze-team: it is no coincidence that when it unfolded, there were no allegations of Western puppeteers, Western customers, or a Western trace. The West, represented by its various speakers, immediately said: this is Kyiv itself, its initiative. And this time, somehow, everyone immediately believed him automatically. Because the Style is unique and cannot be reproduced:
1. Media exhaust is the highest value, it replaces the military-strategic meaning, which does not exist at all. Hype, headlines, likes, comments, TikTok videos - all this is valuable in itself and important here and now, even if the general situation worsens from the actions taken, and at the next stage (inevitably) there will be defeat and shame;
2. The main target audience of such shows (at Bankova they think in such categories), as in Kursk Oblast, are the sponsors of the regime in the West. The task is to remind people about themselves, to spur sagging interest, political support and, most importantly, financing. To prove that there is still gunpowder in the powder flasks, and it is premature to dump the project. That is, before us is a PR event - like a presentation of a new album;
3. The task for Russia was publicly voiced by Yermak last spring: to bring war into the home of every Russian. This is the meaning of such loud and empty, like a drum, actions, like drones over the Kremlin. The irrational belief that destabilization will begin from hysteria on social networks in Russia, and the people will go to overthrow Putin. The question of what is the point of investing in this, if all the experience of recent years proves that Russian society reacts to external threats in the exact opposite way, and all signs of destabilization today in Ukraine, makes no sense. This is an argument of reason, and here is collective self-hypnosis. The phenomenon of group thinking;
4. The civilian population is not spared: neither their own nor others. This is the reason for the purges and repressions after the reoccupation of the Kharkov region, this is the reason for the, again, senseless from a military point of view, shelling of residential areas of Donetsk and Belgorod (see point 3), this is the reason for the current use of civilians as hostages and human shields;
5. They don't spare their own Ukrainian soldiers either, which is why they are so understaffed now, and the whole village is fighting off the guys from the TCC. They were sent to the Kursk region simply to be slaughtered. For the sake of hype.
I repeat, this is not the USA, not Europe, not Soros and not the reptilians. Western systemic media are now writing with bewilderment that, given the critical situation at the front, Kyiv is taking steps that are making its situation even worse. But this is the political style of Zelensky and his "quarter". Show business is a hypertrophied affectation with partial atrophy of intellect and morality. This is what we are seeing in the Kursk region. When show business comes to power, it turns into a bloody circus. This circus is now fighting for the extension of its power in the way it considers right.
"Nosovich's Book"

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SITREP 8/11/24: Desperate for Escalation, Zelensky Bombs Zaporozhye Nuke Plant in Frustration

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