The Modern War Institute at West Point—a sort of think tank chaired by Mark Esper and which is a part of the Department of Military Instruction—released a very interesting in-depth analysis of Russia’s battlefield innovations in the SMO, called: THE RUSSIAN WAY OF WAR IN UKRAINE: A MILITARY APPROACH NINE DECADES IN THE MAKING.
What's interesting to me is while both sides/strategies have advanced and evolved. It seems like both sides were kind of caught with their pants down in 2 areas entering this conflict. The huge impact short range drones and mines would have. With troops forced to spread out and maneuver in smaller numbers drones become more than an annoyance and a mine field can really slow down your movement.
If I may be flippant about it, this represents the Uberization of warfare. Individual commanders (drivers) are now making local judgments based on conditions observed on the ground, marshaling their individual resources (vehicles) in pursuit of an overall objective (transport). An entire centralized logistics trail, body of doctrine, and command infrastructure (the Uber app, servers, and company) are now deployed to enable, rather than to control, the commander-driver. The main reason for this, as mentioned, is that larger concentrations will simply be blown to bits. The requirements for commander-drivers will increase, and more will be needed. The greater and greater importance of a ready reserve well-trained operators and commanders could see the return of mandatory military service.
Anyone unbiased who wanted to know what is happening in this war would gain a lot from reading this article. Further confirmation for us who read a lot because we care. I expect that one reason why Western Media has been so easily manipulated by the fake narrative is because they're a actor-led culture. Hollywood is not a war expert giving lessons on how to save lives. Bravery is not running to certain death. Foolishness is judging a war like its a movie with an expendable sidekick the hero has to avenge.
Architect of Soviet Victory in World War II: The Life and Theories of G.S. Isserson, by Richard W. Harrison combines a biography of Isserson with detailed discussion of his work on Deep Operations.
Isserson's rehabilitation in 1955 allowed him to return to Moscow but his difficult personality prevented him from returning to the General Staff Academy. The rise of Brezhnev made Isserson's life difficult as he was Jewish. The book describes movingly how Marshal Vasilievsky sent Isserson an autographed copy of his memoirs but alluding why he could not acknowledge Isserson in the text itself.
It is obvious when those with real interest in truth write. This is far more insightful then the combined efforts of the ISW, Bellingcat, Carnegie Mellon Institute fart huffers.
They can't even put together a coherent argument for anything, just make things up then repeat em till it's believed.
Great write up and good find re: the west point analysis
You can see various militaries around the world trying to find a "solution" to the problem being outlined. The Western militaries operate on a doctrine of 1) air superiority 2) stealth superiority 3) precision, long range strike and 4) fully networked forces under an ISR umbrella
But, take away any 1 or 2 of these presumptions, and the whole thing falls apart. Also, I am ever more curious now on Chinese "drone swarm" launchers; suggesting to me that Sino thinking is already thinking ahead of how to deal with this. I can envision a near-future of a battlefield saturated with radar-invisible, AI-controlled, long duration loitering munitions fired hundreds at a time from highly mobile truck units.
I wonder actually if, last April, when HIMARS was introduced, it was a "OH, OK" moment for the Russian military, where theory met reality in an instant. In a sense, the US handed it to the Russians on a platter, because they gave them the chance to encounter the system in a way which would be painful, but far from decisive. Were it introduced in far larger quantities and in tandem with Storm Shadow, ATACMS, 4th gen aircraft, MBT's, helicopters (?) - more or less a proper NATO army - the impact would have been more devastating. Now, the Russians know what to do.
"The Gulf War was a practical demonstration of the truth that technological superiority in weapons could cancel the enemy's numerical advantage in weapons long come of age. It was the first time in the history of wars that formidable ground forces half a million strong did not put up a fight in an effort to win. They were only fully deployed in the last days of the war when the Iraqi army was as good as finished by air and missile strikes that went on for weeks."
And then there’s this issue, not mentioned in the MWI sections cited, that the Iraqi army didn’t show up to fight. I found the following in the article linked below recently on some obscure site and experienced a major “ah ha:”
The War That Wasn’t
"The most obvious thousand-ton elephant in the room must first be swiftly gotten out of the way:
There was no actual ‘war’.
You’ve read that right. The active conflict invasion stage of the ‘war’, dubbed Operation Iraqi Freedom, was in fact a giant canard, a holographic Military-Industrial-Media-Complex projection—an abject Hollywood illusory fraud. In the parlance of the soldiers themselves who took part in it, it was called a ‘thunder run to Baghdad’—and for good reason.
What was once oft-discussed in those days, but is now conveniently buried in the memory-holes of American alt-history is the fact that almost every Iraqi general was paid off by the CIA and various US intelligence services to lay down their arms, along with the men under their command, and surrender.
At the time of the invasion in March 2003, many newspapers were rife with reports about this. Here’s an excerpt from UK’s ‘Independent’:
Senior Iraqi officers who commanded troops crucial to the defence of key Iraqi cities were bribed not to fight by American special forces, the US general in charge of the war has confirmed.
Well before hostilities started, special forces troops and intelligence agents paid sums of money to a number of Iraqi officers, whose support was deemed important to a swift, low-casualty victory.
Even the US Army Supreme Commander for the war effort, General Tommy Franks attested to the fact:
General Tommy Franks, the US army commander for the war, said these Iraqi officers had acknowledged their loyalties were no longer with the Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein, but with their American paymasters. As a result, many officers chose not to defend their positions as American and British forces pushed north from Kuwait.
"I had letters from Iraqi generals saying: 'I now work for you'," General Franks said.
And here they admit that the bribing part of the operation was even more important than the purely kinetic aspect of the ‘war’:
"This part of the operation was as important as the shooting part; maybe more important. We knew that some units would fight out of a sense of duty and patriotism, and they did. But it didn't change the outcome because we knew how many of these [Iraqi generals] were going to call in sick," he added."
Yes readers, this analysis was provided by your host, S:
The Iraq War Was A Sham
We mark the 20 year anniversary of the fraudulent Operation Iraqi Freedom by reframing it with a new, revealing historiography.
Do you suppose the MWI writers know this? And BTW, the MWI analysis of Iraq is undoubtedly what the US was intending even if it didn't actually come into play in fact.
Great article, as per usual. Your mention of electronic warfare leaves me hoping for a future article outlining the role it plays in todays modem battlefield.
Given the immense cost of fielding a proper modern army, is (actually) planning for a large scale war still feasible? Not suggesting that it won't happen (heck, there is one now) but it seems that, in event of one, a lot of things will need to be improvised--and a lot of societies would not be able to adapt, as the requirements extend far beyond the military. If large scale wars become more frequent, the "military revolution" won't be limited to military only, but will shape the way societies, economies, and governments are organized--not unlike another context in which the term "military revolution" was coined in 1950s (it was in reference to the parallel developments in 16-18th centuries.)
Excellent and interesting as always
Slow news day? ;D
What's interesting to me is while both sides/strategies have advanced and evolved. It seems like both sides were kind of caught with their pants down in 2 areas entering this conflict. The huge impact short range drones and mines would have. With troops forced to spread out and maneuver in smaller numbers drones become more than an annoyance and a mine field can really slow down your movement.
If I may be flippant about it, this represents the Uberization of warfare. Individual commanders (drivers) are now making local judgments based on conditions observed on the ground, marshaling their individual resources (vehicles) in pursuit of an overall objective (transport). An entire centralized logistics trail, body of doctrine, and command infrastructure (the Uber app, servers, and company) are now deployed to enable, rather than to control, the commander-driver. The main reason for this, as mentioned, is that larger concentrations will simply be blown to bits. The requirements for commander-drivers will increase, and more will be needed. The greater and greater importance of a ready reserve well-trained operators and commanders could see the return of mandatory military service.
Even war is not immune to techbros.
Great Commentary, thorough and professional. Congrats for your work!
thanks! insightful!
Anyone unbiased who wanted to know what is happening in this war would gain a lot from reading this article. Further confirmation for us who read a lot because we care. I expect that one reason why Western Media has been so easily manipulated by the fake narrative is because they're a actor-led culture. Hollywood is not a war expert giving lessons on how to save lives. Bravery is not running to certain death. Foolishness is judging a war like its a movie with an expendable sidekick the hero has to avenge.
And meanwhile, the American economy and culture nosedivebombs into the void.
I sure hope Russia can win, and sooner than later. Of course , Russia will not lose....
JoeBiden stole my car this morning, that dog
Interesting article!
Architect of Soviet Victory in World War II: The Life and Theories of G.S. Isserson, by Richard W. Harrison combines a biography of Isserson with detailed discussion of his work on Deep Operations.
Isserson's rehabilitation in 1955 allowed him to return to Moscow but his difficult personality prevented him from returning to the General Staff Academy. The rise of Brezhnev made Isserson's life difficult as he was Jewish. The book describes movingly how Marshal Vasilievsky sent Isserson an autographed copy of his memoirs but alluding why he could not acknowledge Isserson in the text itself.
It is obvious when those with real interest in truth write. This is far more insightful then the combined efforts of the ISW, Bellingcat, Carnegie Mellon Institute fart huffers.
They can't even put together a coherent argument for anything, just make things up then repeat em till it's believed.
Great write up and good find re: the west point analysis
You can see various militaries around the world trying to find a "solution" to the problem being outlined. The Western militaries operate on a doctrine of 1) air superiority 2) stealth superiority 3) precision, long range strike and 4) fully networked forces under an ISR umbrella
But, take away any 1 or 2 of these presumptions, and the whole thing falls apart. Also, I am ever more curious now on Chinese "drone swarm" launchers; suggesting to me that Sino thinking is already thinking ahead of how to deal with this. I can envision a near-future of a battlefield saturated with radar-invisible, AI-controlled, long duration loitering munitions fired hundreds at a time from highly mobile truck units.
I wonder actually if, last April, when HIMARS was introduced, it was a "OH, OK" moment for the Russian military, where theory met reality in an instant. In a sense, the US handed it to the Russians on a platter, because they gave them the chance to encounter the system in a way which would be painful, but far from decisive. Were it introduced in far larger quantities and in tandem with Storm Shadow, ATACMS, 4th gen aircraft, MBT's, helicopters (?) - more or less a proper NATO army - the impact would have been more devastating. Now, the Russians know what to do.
❤️Wage Peace,
🌟Keep the Faith,
#DeNazthePlanet!
The Modern War Institute:
"The Gulf War was a practical demonstration of the truth that technological superiority in weapons could cancel the enemy's numerical advantage in weapons long come of age. It was the first time in the history of wars that formidable ground forces half a million strong did not put up a fight in an effort to win. They were only fully deployed in the last days of the war when the Iraqi army was as good as finished by air and missile strikes that went on for weeks."
And then there’s this issue, not mentioned in the MWI sections cited, that the Iraqi army didn’t show up to fight. I found the following in the article linked below recently on some obscure site and experienced a major “ah ha:”
The War That Wasn’t
"The most obvious thousand-ton elephant in the room must first be swiftly gotten out of the way:
There was no actual ‘war’.
You’ve read that right. The active conflict invasion stage of the ‘war’, dubbed Operation Iraqi Freedom, was in fact a giant canard, a holographic Military-Industrial-Media-Complex projection—an abject Hollywood illusory fraud. In the parlance of the soldiers themselves who took part in it, it was called a ‘thunder run to Baghdad’—and for good reason.
What was once oft-discussed in those days, but is now conveniently buried in the memory-holes of American alt-history is the fact that almost every Iraqi general was paid off by the CIA and various US intelligence services to lay down their arms, along with the men under their command, and surrender.
At the time of the invasion in March 2003, many newspapers were rife with reports about this. Here’s an excerpt from UK’s ‘Independent’:
Senior Iraqi officers who commanded troops crucial to the defence of key Iraqi cities were bribed not to fight by American special forces, the US general in charge of the war has confirmed.
Well before hostilities started, special forces troops and intelligence agents paid sums of money to a number of Iraqi officers, whose support was deemed important to a swift, low-casualty victory.
Even the US Army Supreme Commander for the war effort, General Tommy Franks attested to the fact:
General Tommy Franks, the US army commander for the war, said these Iraqi officers had acknowledged their loyalties were no longer with the Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein, but with their American paymasters. As a result, many officers chose not to defend their positions as American and British forces pushed north from Kuwait.
"I had letters from Iraqi generals saying: 'I now work for you'," General Franks said.
And here they admit that the bribing part of the operation was even more important than the purely kinetic aspect of the ‘war’:
"This part of the operation was as important as the shooting part; maybe more important. We knew that some units would fight out of a sense of duty and patriotism, and they did. But it didn't change the outcome because we knew how many of these [Iraqi generals] were going to call in sick," he added."
Yes readers, this analysis was provided by your host, S:
The Iraq War Was A Sham
We mark the 20 year anniversary of the fraudulent Operation Iraqi Freedom by reframing it with a new, revealing historiography.
3-13-23
https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/the-iraq-war-was-a-sham?
Do you suppose the MWI writers know this? And BTW, the MWI analysis of Iraq is undoubtedly what the US was intending even if it didn't actually come into play in fact.
Great article, as per usual. Your mention of electronic warfare leaves me hoping for a future article outlining the role it plays in todays modem battlefield.
Given the immense cost of fielding a proper modern army, is (actually) planning for a large scale war still feasible? Not suggesting that it won't happen (heck, there is one now) but it seems that, in event of one, a lot of things will need to be improvised--and a lot of societies would not be able to adapt, as the requirements extend far beyond the military. If large scale wars become more frequent, the "military revolution" won't be limited to military only, but will shape the way societies, economies, and governments are organized--not unlike another context in which the term "military revolution" was coined in 1950s (it was in reference to the parallel developments in 16-18th centuries.)
Thank you, again, for your hard and uncompromising work. I feel empowered by the knowledge I gain. I thank God for having you around.