Excellent analysis. As a former field artillery officer (US Army) I've wondered why Russian counter-battery fire hasn't largely shut Ukrainian artillery down given Russia's numerical and technical advantage. I will note, I've been out of that line of work for many years.
There are many aspects to this, in general as mentioned in the article, the Russian CB does regularly take out Ukrainian units but they are supplied by a constant flood of new units so it's impossible to fully neutralize them all. But also, in many frontlines where it seems Ukraine's artillery operates with impunity, there's a misconception there because those frontlines don't have any Russian forces, but rather DPR/LPR, whose artillery standards and equipment aren't the same. For instance the infamous Donetsk area where Ukrainian artillery constantly shells Donetsk, there are no Russian forces in that region so it's the DPR forced to respond and play CB games. And this goes back to my original point (enumerated bestin Part 1: https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/the-coming-russian-offensive-2023) that Russia is using a FAR smaller force than most people believed, and so their units are stretched thin and are not operating on every front.
But that's not to take credit away from AFU, as I mentioned in this article, the AFU's artillery units are second to none and now considered by many even American experts as 'best in th world', not only due to the sheer near-peer experience they've now accumulated in real combat, but the vast array of modernized equipment and munitions they operate, not to mention all the digital network-centric integration I discussed in this report.
Also their discipline in many units (not all but many) is very strong in terms of camouflaging, scoot-n-shoot and re-positioning tactics and things of that nature.
And most importantly, there is HEAVY indication that a lot of the most advanced systems are actually manned DIRECTLY by NATO forces, which operate in a fairly harm-free way from the rear. For instance, most notably there were several pieces of direct evidence that many/most of the Polish AHS Krab SPG's are operated directly by Polish servicemen. Not only is there a video of an AFU soldier outright saying that the Poles come in on their Krabs, fire off a few rounds then scram, in strict scoot-n-shoot fashion, but there was other strong evidence as well. At 1:50 of this video you can see what I'm talking about https://www.bitchute.com/video/aUHstFGzEgnH/
Good points. I've also wondered where they are finding Ukrainians to operate complex systems with which they aren't familiar. As the Russians no doubt know targeting FA command and control (fire direction centers, target acquisition, comms, etc.) would have longer term impacts on FA ops since they'd be taking out highly trained personnel and equipment which would be difficult or impossible to replace quickly.
I want to note, Ukrainian artillery personnel at all levels deserve nothing but condemnation and consequences for terrorizing civilian populations in the Donbas region. I hope those which survive suffer profoundly. It would have been my duty to refuse to carry out such heinous unlawful fire missions in the US military, and I would have refused.
Yep...and also to mention that a good portion (maybe majority at this point?) of "counter-battery" is now being done by loitering drones, at least on the Russian side. Simply because it's much easier and more effective. Everyday we get more videos of it and just today another 3 or so new ones arrived of AFU M777, 2S1 Gvozdika, and Bm-21 Grad being taken out by the Russian Lancet: https://odysee.com/@Overthrown:6/M6hhwiBZvc4qdNHP:b
In some ways that method is replacing traditional 'counter battery' and will likely only get more and more efficient in future, though of course more countermeasures against it will pop up as well: https://www.bitchute.com/video/yv7DZFpxPla1/
Well they lack a bit on power, but it's a trade off for their size/speed/endurance, and also they have cumulative warheads so it's not the raw 'explosive' effect that's doing the damage, but rather the HEAT-style penetration of a shaped charge which blasts forward melting steel and coring out enemy equipment. So it won't 'blow the wheels off' of the towed howitzer, but will slice a decent hole through its most delicately aligned parts and either make it a complete write off or take it out of action for a long time
Indeed, there a a number of critical mechanisms and sighting instruments which would be taken out by even a small shaped charge. And a SP howitzer with propelling charges and shells inside might have a really bad day. They weren't heavily armored, at least not back in my day.
Thanks for the in depth explanation of what you see going on - I have not read much written about ISR in UKR but thought it would be critical.. Some of my thoughts, as an ex-FAC(A), but way out of touch these days. I think that RU has prepared it's forces for NATO/WW3, so a total war. This is why this op is called an SMO. They still need to keep their main forces and abilities prepared for war, not showing them to everyone in UKR. If they decide it is a 'war', then the NATO++ SIGINT aircraft will immediately be targeted, as will the satellites, and probably many NATO installations. So much of what we have seen could well be 'deception' through limitations on equipment and usage, thus the lessons learned may be false once war starts proper - the relatively small role of airpower for example.
You're right and a few choice 'hints' were sent recently in that respect. For instance, not only did Russia repeat the warning to take down western commercial satellites https://www.rt.com/russia/571585-quasi-civilian-satellites-nato/ but one Russian official even released a statement that, in the future if any Ukrainian/Western jets take off from the airfields of a different country, go into Ukraine to conduct a sortie/attack mission, and then go back to land at that secondary country, then the airfields of that country will become legitimate targets for Russia.
Still reading this - fascinating insight into modern hi tech warfare. Are we reaching a point where this type of war is becoming pointless or even unthinkable?
Well to some extent that's what Gerasimov himself was getting at in his "doctrine", which is why he outlined a recommendation of 4:1 ratio of nonmilitary (political, hybrid, etc) force vs. military force in a given conflict. He believed that the direct military KINETIC portion of a conflict is almost starting to take a backseat to the other developments under the surface.
With that said, he revised this later on in light of the brewing Ukrainian war as he knew a large classical WW2 style conflict was still on the cards.
Anyway I plan to do another piece on that specific topic a bit later on, that goes more indepth in the automation and future artificial intelligence dominated warfare
One of my big misgivings from the get go has been the pr campaign against Russia and all the false claims and all Russia does is have their guy get up and say, "yesterday we killed 3 tanks 4 trucks and a helicopter. Thank you for coming."
Yeah there's a LOT to say about Russia's poor information management on the surface level. Beneath the surface, they are likely doing far more than we know of, secret hybrid war programs that are likely having major influence on things we can't even fathom, but the surface presentations leave much to be desired. Not only that but Russia's SEEMING failure to properly develop an ethos, zeitgeist or "movement" around the 'spirit' of the operation and what's happening. The Kremlin's handling of it has been criticized as clunky. For instance, in Moscow there are these sort of vapid, plain and strangely abstract military recruitment posters that just have a giant "Z" on them. But they don't galvanize the population with any proper message that shows an understanding of what the 'fight' is even about. It's this weird disconnect between the Kremlin and the ethos of what's happening. But with that said, too many people jump to a polar extreme, just because something isn't done 100% well, they immediately sensationalize it and say it's being down "100% negatively". Truth is, the Kremlin's handling is not absolutely horrible, it's just not as well done as it could be. There's merit in grading something realistically and maybe they get a C, or B- or something but not necessarily an F or even D because, after all, they HAVE at least galvanized a lot of popular support in an effective way, and even with recent criticisms and 'controversies', new polls still show an iron 78% + support of Putin/Gov't. They just haven't found the true heart and spirit of this conflict yet, due to some of the failures of it, they've waffled around from idea to idea, and ideologically and metaphysically they're clumsily groping at answers.
I would say the Russians are winning the information war with the only people that matter: The Global South. This is where the bulk of the world's population and resources are. The West is on the way out, it's elites so divorced from reality and their constituents that violent change is on order.
yep this is quite true, and is the other big argument on this topic. Although one could say by far the most important audience to win the hearts and minds of is the domestic Russian one. And while Russia has won them in general just based on the sheer enmity and racism the West has shown the Russian people, it sort of is natural for them to support the Russian gov't and SMO during this time. BUT Rus gov't still could have done far better in not just vaguely getting their support but building more of a cohesive ideological vision in line with what I mentioned in the above post. This is a bit of a failing but like I said still more of a win than a fail in general.
And you're right, if anything, the west is now devolving into a bizarre pathological mass psychosis in regard to Russian affairs so even if Russia is "losing" the information war in the West, it's sort of a poison pill or trojan horse because the West is also losing by so psychotically embracing their Russophobia, they are devouring themselves and rotting their own souls, creating an ever deeper cesspit of perversion, deceit, and immorality amongst themselves. In many ways that alone is a big victory for Russia
Yes, Russian flags have appeared among crowds in Africa and elsewhere. The anti-imperialist struggle against banksterism and its entourage of cronies proceeds. The west's financial gyrations around the plug hole are proceeding: failure abroad, repression at home.
It seems impossible to understand this war thinking of Ukraine as the primary battlefield. In 5GW narrative drives kinetics, not the reverse. Ukraine and what happens there (or Sudan) are the tip of the iceberg. How is the world economic order being reshaped? How is Russia leveraging the BRICS to isolate the US? How are weak points in NATO/EU being leveraged to create conflict in the opposition? What is the state of the Petro-dollar?
You're right about Gerasimov and his 4:1 ratio. Modern warfare unfolds asymmetricly. We think the main battlefield is Ukraine. Certainly thinkers like Brzezinski or Kagan wanted that. While Ukraine is important and what's happening there is tragic, the real tell for how the war is going seems to be Saudi Arabia, China, and India. That is where Russia is waging information war the West doesn't really censor because so far the US doesn't even think the BRICS world worthwhile to pay attention to. The US still uses sanctions like the rest of the world has no choice or voice.
Russia isn't fighting hard in the West. Why fight for a population's perception when something like Nord Stream can take place and Europe still ties itself to the US. There is no point to contending that space. Russia is effective where the world is receptive, outside the West.
The US and Ukraine lost when the Saudi's said they would trade oil for other currencies besides dollars. Ukraine is showing the world the unilateral world has died. The most powerful, most funded military and its alliance cannot put Russia to bed. In the West the analysts are saying it took Russia 9 months to take Bakhmut. Meanwhile, over half the world is watching, realizing that the greatest military on earth with all its technology could not use Ukraine to shut Russia down. It doesn't matter what the West thinks. It matters where Gerasimov 4 to 1 are being used. Those 4 are loud and clear outside the West.
Wow ! thank you for this detailed overview of ISR. I know absolutely nothing about military matters, but you have provided me with an appreciation of just how technical and complex a modern battfield is. Keep up the good work.
Hi, lot's of interesting information and analysis.
One part did cause me to raise a few eyebrows though, when you talked about the 'Gerasimov Doctrine'. To the best of my knowledge, it doesn't exist. The notion was invented by the west (Mark Galeotti to be more precise, after which the MSM and intelligence services ran with it), to be able to point to Russia as the evil mastermind behind whatever bad happened in the world ("it's Russian hybrid warfare! It's Russian meddling/interfering! That's what they do, they have a whole doctrine for it!"), and by attaching Gerasimov's name to it, they tried to label the very thing they were doing themselves (colour revolutions, coups, rigging elections, assassinating people, spreading disinformation through manipulated media, etc) as something foreign, and Russian in particular.
They didn't invent this notion out of thin air, there was something akin to this which was much older, the Primakov Doctrine. That was focused on foreign policy and Russia's place in the world, and not a military policy or doctrine.
Gerasimov in turn, wrote an article in February 2013 called 'the value of science in prediction' (that's the translation at least), in the 'Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kurier' (I hope I got that name right). It's not a long article, and in it he describes how the rules of war have changed, and how as a result the classical distinction between military operations and civilian ones have become so blurred that it's no longer valid to distinguish them at all. He does this based on what the West had been doing (Arab, spring, colour revolutions, etc), and describes, in general terms, what challenges that poses for the traditional military.
There's two graphic's in his article, one called 'Change in the character of warfare - Achievement of political goals' and the other is 'The Role of Nonmilitary Methods in the Resolution of Interstate Conflicts - The primary phases (stages) of conflict development'. It is analytical in nature, it is not proscribing anything like a practical doctrine.
The article was published in a, by western standards, rather obscure publication, and was pretty much missed by mainstream annalists in the west, until Mark Galeotti picked it up, who recognised the author, and who was instantly intrigued. He then wrote an article about it, came up with the name 'Gerasomiv Doctrine' and pretty much made up a lot of stuff that's not in the original article. Now his article did catch the attention of the rest of the western media pack, and like 'chinese whispers', his article got twisted and subverted in turn, leading to the purely western invention now paraded as the 'Gerasimov Doctrine'.
Galeotti wrote another article a couple of years ago, in which he apologised for having invented the term and inadvertently created a shitstorm based on a lie.
Oh yes, I'm aware--that's what I was referring to where I mentioned the 'controversy' surrounding the doctrine. BUT, the thing is, when Gerasimov made his presentation (yes, he didn't write an article, the article was a translation of a speech/presentation Gerasimov made to the Academy of Military Sciences), he outlined a bunch of these hybrid war topics in 2013 right on the eve of Russia's incursions into both Ukraine (Crimea - 2014) and Syria (2015). And Russia's actions utilized exactly the strictures he seemed to outline in his speech, thus crystallizing the fact that Gerasimov was in fact verbalizing the emergence of a new internal doctrine for the Russian armed forces. After all, it's a bit too 'coincidental' for him to make such a landmark speech, naming specific hybrid scenarios, and then utilize them for the first time only months later (and he himself recognized it wasn't used before, as in his very speech he admitted that Georgia 2008 was in some ways a failure of these modern methods).
So, is it an official emblemized doctrine, no, but did Russia actually mark a very critical shift in doctrinal approach, particularly when they took Crimea in an extremely surprising and successful enactment of 'hybrid war'? Yes. And did Gerasimov herald this new era in his speech? It seems so. Thus, in a sort of unofficial and informal way, it becomes cemented into history as his 'doctrine' despite not being an official one. And beyond the pointless semantic points of whether it's his doctrine or not, the main point remains which is that the guy currently put in charge of the armed forces is the one who, officially or unofficially, marked an important doctrinal shift in Russian military culture toward modern next generational warfare. And so the point I was simply making is, that's a favorable sign for future Russian military actions and coming offensives.
Sorry, I should have realised you were aware of the origins of the term. But I do take exception of using the term 'Gerasimov Doctrine' as if it is a genuine in Russian military doctrine, while there is no such thing.
There are if you like, two very different, even opposed, policies/doctrines which you refer to under the same name. There is the fictitious 'Gerasimov Doctrine', which as I said was invented by the west, to paint Russia as the bad guy with regards to who's responsible for hybrid warfare acts around the world. It strongly implies (and many even describe explicitly as such) an radical change in military posture and the manner in which war is waged, and here's the crucial bit, and that it is actively being waged by the owner of the 'doctrine'. Which here would the Russians, through Gerasimov. This is purported to be an active 'doctrine' that Russia is said to be continuously waging against the west, hence the link that is made with the Primakov Doctrine (which did exist).
Secondly, there is the slow and gradual change (as opposed to the radical change implied by the word 'doctrine') in dealing with potential threats to the nation that the Russian military and security apparatus have been engaged in. This latter is nothing new, but a constant throughout history. Gerasimov in 2013 identified some of the newly arising threats as they are emerging in this century. Again, nothing new, the content of the emerging threats may be new, but conducting the threat assessment itself is pretty much part of his job description. And as his predecessors, it is his responsibility to adjust existing policies or come up with new ones to address these new threats. This by itself is just part of his job, business as usual, and by itself does not qualify as a 'doctrine' or doctrinal change.
The two interpretations differ fundamentally from each other, as the fake 'Gerasimov Doctrine' is formulated in such a way as to make Russia the aggressor, the one waging hybrid warfare. This doctrine is portrayed as an active one, one constantly being waged upon the west, and against which the west needs to defend itself. It's a threat the west invented to scare its own people into further submission. It's a new iteration of the 'Red Scare' propaganda.
But the actual, gradual, change in security posture and policy of Russia under Gerasimov is the opposite! It is defensive in nature, and aimed to protect Russia against the kind of hybrid warfare the west has been waging for decades now. It is reactive in nature, not active. That is what Gerasimov referred to in 2013, and that is what they did in Syria and Crimea, reactive measures against hybrid warfare waged AGAINST Russia (and its vital interests).
The west has pulled the same trick over and over again, and they did it here too. They proactively assign to their adversaries what they do themselves. We've seen this kind of projection all the time in the SMO from the Ukrainians and western MSM/'experts'. The accuse Russia in advance of what they do themselves, thereby lessening the impact of the counter-accusations and obfuscating what's really happening.
By using the term 'Gerasimov Doctrine' you are, inadvertently as it seems, legitimising the made-up western interpretation that paints Russia as the perpetrator of hybrid warfare around the world. That's what triggered me. The two are very different, and should not be referred to by the same name. In fact, the phrase 'Gerasimov Doctrine' should completely disappear, as it is tainted beyond repair.
Finally, to support my points, I would like to point to Russia's poor efforts, if not outright failure, on the hybrid battlefield prior to and during most of the SMO. It lost the PR war in the west right away, and Russia media still can't reach any audience there, nor do Russian voices have any access to mainstream western media. They struggled at first to win over audiences outside the west too, and when and where they did, it was largely thanks to classical diplomacy and economic policies, which didn't differ all that much from what they were doing anyway. No radical shift there either.
And Russia has consistently been the victim of hybrid warfare, not the perpetrator (Nordstream bombing, Kerch bridge, and a range of sabotage attacks and assassinations in both Russia and the formerly Ukrainian territories). So either Russia has been so good at its own hybrid warfare that we (including the western media/militaries/intelligence services) don't even recognise it when they commit 'hybrid warfare' against the west, or the far more likely explanation, that they're not very good at it, if they wage it at all. And that more likely explanation very strongly implies no doctrinal shift at all under Gerasimov, but rather the gradual accommodation of already existing security capabilities to the new emerging threats (see Crimea and Syria), instead of creating new and conceptually different capabilities, as the 'Gerasimov Docrine' would have us believe.
Well you make some good points so I respect your views on it.
But for the hybrid warfare, I do suspect that Russia is carrying out far more than people know about. Not only in the 'cultural sphere' but even asymmetric warfare in the sense of sabotage and such similar to the Kerch. After all, in a previous article I pointed out the rather 'coincidental' destruction of almost all 152mm ammo factories in neighboring eastern european countries like Czech, Romania, Bulgaria. I don't think this is some 3rd party "doing Russia a favor" if you get my drift.
^ This is what constructive disagreement looks like. Kudos to both Simplicius and Flabbergaster.
To Simplicius: thank you for this post and the series to which it belongs. It is illuminating to this non-professional, fleshing out concepts I've encountered in the past year when reading or listening to, to pick a few, Martyanov, Big Serge here on Substack, Bernard from Moon of Alabama, MacGregor, Ritter, Johnson, McGovern, Mercouris, and Bertelec. I'm not ready to throw around part numbers and acronyms, but I may better understand events because of your efforts and those of others.
To Flabbergaster: On your points about the so-called Gerasimov Doctrine I'm inclined to agree. The West rarely misses an opportunity to conduct operations via public relations, the aim of which is, as Herman and Chomsky memorably put it, the manufacture of consent. In that form of "industrial" warfare the West seems far ahead, though I say that from within the propaganda bubble of the Western sphere; apparently in the rest of the world that bubble has lost a bit of its volume. Needless to say, propaganda techniques are incompatible with the informed consent necessary for democratic legitimacy, a fine point that seemingly eludes Western officials and media pretending to represent a clear alternative to autocracy.
Thanks. Yeah, I try not to be 'dogmatic' about things and usually am not a fan of commentators/bloggers/etc who are 'certain' they are right about a given topic. I only present my own well researched views, but don't try to push them down others' throats like an ideologue etc. And technically what Flabbergaster is saying is true that there is no real 'Doctrine' per se and it's also true they used the misattribution as part of their ongoing propaganda war to demonize Russia. But I was merely using it more as 'shorthand' to simply convey the point that whether it's an official doctrine or not, Gerasimov proved with his presentation, that he has his 'ear to the ground' in light of recent military developments and revolutions, and that therefore, he is likely a capable commander.
On propaganda, I'd love to read a spin doctor's handbook along the lines of "Confessions of an Economic Hitman." Clearly officials know well how to get ahead of stories and deflect blame by accusing others of what they're up to. It's like a crook who yells "Stop, thief!" to get a crowd to look the other way while he walks off with your wallet. It's somewhat like what psychologists call projection, but that's an unconscious defense, whereas what I'm describing is a conscious tool for manipulation. Gaslighting comes closer, since its intent is FUD things up. Just now I also found "accusation in a mirror," the heading of Wikipedia page on this subject. It features a quote from Goebbels, which I'll adapt for the sake of generality: The cleverest trick used in propaganda is to accuse our enemies of what we ourselves are doing. That may be what Flabbergaster is getting at and why he felt it was worth mentioning. It doesn't detract from the piece. In fact your conversation with him adds to it.
maybe you'd like to contribute to a little collaborative effort I proposed (see the other reply I made in this thread). All suggestions are welcome, and please, do feel free to criticise my points! That's how I learn.
I can sense my own views slightly shifting already. ;-)
I'm very glad to see your blog evolving into one where we can have constructive debates, and as Dingusansich put it, have constructive disagreement. By exposing ourselves to different viewpoints, arguments other than the ones we use, and facts we may have overlooked, we allow ourselves to learn and grow. It is impossible to do that if you do not first accept you might be wrong on something.
With regards to hybrid warfare, I make the following distinctions, and that drives my thinking on it:
1) proactive or offensive (intended to harm the enemy) versus reactive or defensive (intended to protect against the enemy's proactive use of hybrid warfare).
2) Accommodation/adjusting of existing capabilities to conduct either proactive or reactive hybrid warfare versus the development of conceptually new capabilities.
(By the way, why you mention 'waging hybrid warfare' I automatically assume you are referring explicitly to proactive acts, not merely reactive ones. Is that correct?)
For a practical doctrinal shift to have occurred within the Russian military, and not just a theoretical one, we would need to see evidence of all four, so both old and new capabilities used in both proactive and reactive ways. And we would have to see a significant amount of it, in ways that truly make a difference, across a wide spectrum of applications.
In addition, if we can see a lack of certain expected capabilities, or the exclusive use of traditional means in certain situations, that absence is indicative of a lack of doctrinal shift. Obviously there's no clear marker to tell us if the shift in Russia's stance regarding is 'doctrinal' or 'incremental'. I strongly believe it is the latter.
I think what would be interesting is to see if we can come up with a list of examples that would qualify either as the presence of hybrid warfare capabilities or the lack of it where we would have expected it. We can then qualify them according to the above criteria. I think it could prove to be a nice collaborative effort. I'll start us off:
1. Proactive and New capability
- Wagner, in particular it's use in Africa and the Middle East
At the moment, this is the only clear example I can see of a conceptually new capability that is being proactively used in a hybrid manner (in kicking France out of Africa, for example)
2. Proactive and Existing (if adjusted) capability
- Taking out ammunition factories in Eastern Europe
- Economic measures tailored to do very specific harm to western economies and the uni-polar order (de-dollarisation for example)
3. Reactive and New capabilities
- Anti-drone air defence capabilities (partly thanks to lessons learned in Syria)
4. Reactive and Existing (if adjusted) capability
- the use of VDV as 'polite green men' in Crimea to prevent the (by then) by their own declaration independent Crimea
- 'Inoculation' of the own population against western propaganda aimed at instigating colour revolutions
- Diplomacy and economic policies to win over nations and people outside the western world
- Military intervention in Syria to prevent western trained/created terrorist organisations taking over the country
- Sanction-proofing the economy prior to the SMO
5. Absent capabilities we would have expected to see
- No meaningful (small) drone capability to speak, no integration of drones at tactical levels, lagging behind both the DPR/LPR and Ukraine at start of SMO
- No meaningful media channels to reach international audiences, leaving many in the world, including most of the west, completely ignorant of Russia's arguments and open to hearing just one side
- Initially very poor communicative skills by the MoD, often leaving many wondering what was going on.
- Little to no apparent support for Russian based alternatives to social media (such as Twitter, YouTube, etc), in particular towards foreign audiences.
As you can see, most of the things I can come up with myself are either reactive with existing capabilities in nature or examples of absent capabilities, hence my own earlier conclusions. But let's park any conclusions for now though, and see if we can add some more to these categories and then try to figure out what that tells us?
I just realised that this 'Gerasimvo Doctrine', whether it's the fake western one or the real Russian adaptations, is pretty much a contradiction in terms.
Gerasimov is the chief-of-staff of Russia's armed forces, yet the whole notion of this new type of warfare is mostly about using non-military means to fight conflicts with enemies. In other words, using capabilities that are NOT under the control of the Russian military and NOT Gerasimov's to use or develop. If you look at the list of examples I put up earlier, the only one that does fall under his purview was the use of VDV troops as 'polite men' in Crimea, and possibly the creation of the new military police force (although I suspect they fall under a different chain of command within the MoD).
I think that was largely his point in 2013 with his speech. He was addressing not so much the military, but other institutions in Russia that also needed to step up. And if he said this publicly in 2013, he likely would have been saying it indoors for much longer. Most of the tools for waging this hybrid warfare fall outside his ability to control, and the apparent lack of Russia's capabilities in many of its aspects should not be blamed on him, nor is it his responsibility to create these capabilities, because the point of hybrid warfare is to use NON-military means.
Going by the snippets Simplicius gives here, I'd say that what is called in the West the 'Gerasimov Doctrine' should be more accurately described as a report of a study. A military paper, not to be confused with Russia's military doctrine.
You're right, although to be even MORE precise, what it actually was in essence was a request to the academy of russian military science for them to 'explore' this new modern way of war. He lists many of the strictures of this style of war himself, but then he outright tells them that the point of his presentation is for the military-science community of Russia to expand on the framework/groundwork that he laid, and see what they can come up with to ensure that Russia continues to stay ahead of the game in the 21st century. So in general, it was more of a 'call to action'.
Because some one wrote it does not mean its doctrine and been practiced. I would love to see the Russian equivalent of NTC or an JRTC… are they now calling it Ukraine?
Eventually these capabilities will lead to a LOT of space junk floating around. Russia is already sounding the alarm on this issue. Using civilian assets only brings this eventuality about faster. NATO really needs to think long and hard about this one, as they could quickly screw themselves in the event space goes hot.
Humanity simply doesn't have the capability to "clean" space. Even a tiny bolt or nut at orbital velocity is unstoppable by anything that we can currently put into space. We are many generations away from understanding gravity enough to leverage it to do work.
it's the phenomenon of a chain reaction occurring from destroying a certain amount of satellites, whereby the debris continues spreading and destroying OTHER satellites which creates even more debris which basically snowballs or avalanches exponentially to the point where EVERYTHING in earth orbit is completely demolished and 'kesslerized' and space orbit becomes utterly unusable for many generations.
There is the risk that if U.S. pushes Russia into defending itself by shooting down several (or more) satellites, then such a catastrophic chain reaction could occur and ruin space forever for everyone.
As the shade of Gen. Ulysses Grant allow me address this familiar logistics problem. How far away did you say the enemy artillery was? Deploy your best forces at the most propitious points and initiate a series of sweeping and powerful assaults. Move decisively to seize and destroy the enemy artillery where it is.
Why ever would you sit and allow your positions to be hit to disadvatage? Move at once. I would send Gen. Sheridan to sweep around the flank and make the enemy position untenable. All this slow-mo stuff is why Gen. McClellan failed to prevail.
The problem is you assume there IS a 'flank'. The frontline is heavily fortified in a straight line (conceptually speaking) so there is no "flanking" of the artillery positions. In order to flank them, you have to first create massive breakthroughs of the 1st echelon defense somewhere, and then penetrate deep into the 'rears' of the enemy. However the AFU as standard doctrine operates minimum of 3 echelon defense lines. That means after the first powerful line (replete with trenches, fortifications, and the whole works), there is a SECOND trench line full of powerful defenses, and then a 3rd behind that. Good luck penetrating all 3 and "flanking" anything, it will typically result in the attacking force being crowded into a killbox.
With that said, there are certainly areas where certain points are weaker than others that COULD be exploited and this is where ISR plays a key role, Russian forces are constantly probing in various directions and using various techniques like recon-by-fire and 'Recon-Pull' methods in order to identify weak areas to TRY and create breakthroughs of the sort you describe, but it's not easy
You make a flank. That's the point. If, at the outset, Russia had deployed sufficient of its professional infantry, like the First Guards Tank Army, they would have overwhelmed the over-matched Ukrainians. There would have been No intact defense lines in short order. As Grant often said, a good commander makes his own opportunities. With air control and moveable armour the Russians could have advanced faster than their enemy could have retreated. All the artillery et al would have been rolled up. End of problem.
The current Russian lilly-dipping strategy certainly is economic in the short run but dragging out the whole business has ratcheted up the total costs for both sides. This was Grant's point about the apparent costs of his Overland Campaign. Three years of lilly-dipping had cost far more. Also, and arguably more important, the political advantage to Russia of blasting straight through to Transnistria would be great. The Big Fait Accompli. Howl all you want EU. And such initiative really encourages hostile parties to be very cautious. And the rest of the world would see Nato mightily humbled. That's worth a few Corps.
I wonder if we aren't deliberating over a cold dish, so to speak?
In some respects NATO has signaled that they are resigned to Ukr's defeat and are transitioning to Plan B (or C or D if you like). Generally speaking this means, make a show of supplying Ukr w weapons etc to ensure they dont quit or capitulate, while prepping for a long and determined effort to sabotage and bleed Russia by asymmetric means in whatever final shape Ukr takes after Russian victory.
The thing we must understand about the Globalist mindset is that it's not about victory or defeat per se. It's about power and control of their own captive populations. Russia, Ukr, China, Iran....all just tools to use for controlling domestic opinion and behaviors.
So the ultimate problem for Russia is how to secure real peace against a fanatical global cartel intent on world denomination at almost any cost. It's the reverse of the Cold War. Russia must outlast the Globalistas and wait for their corrupt system to collapse.
to escalate infrastructure attacks deep inside Russia.
With that said, Russia's next actions (by way of the coming offensive) are still critical in that they need to show a decisive progress and deliver a major psychological blow otherwise, I fear that NATO/EU will bolster their confidence and enthusiasm and recommit to completely militarizing Ukraine and pouring endless cash/aid etc to it.
So despite these signals of flagging commitment on their behalf, I do think Russia still has a lot of pressure riding on them to show a very decisive blow in the next 2-3 months with this offensive
Neither Russia's nor Nato goals are clear in this conflict. Denazification is impossible since Russia will not occupy Galitzia or Ruthenia. On the other hand, Nato's goal of taking back Crimea is also impossible. Russia could be aiming to take all lands east of the Dnipr river which is a reasonable long term strategic goal for stability. But Nato's adamant refusal of diplomacy or negotiations could hide a multilayered purpose. First, to destroy all Eastern Europe, including Poland and the Baltics, in order to create a buffer desert zone to isolate the rest of Europe from Russia. But going further a faction of the hidden powers that be ( basically cyclopean capitals hidden in tax havens) could be targeting a total destruction of ALL adversaries, in order to rebuild the world by brand new global institutions that will be presented as the guardians of perpetual peace. Think about it. Their fake economic schemes are collapsing by the day. When the bubble burst, they will need to divert the people's attention in order to get away with their countless crimes. Boris Johnson by the way, with his Churchillian imperial brain, looks like he wants the whole Europe destroyed, assuming that Britain will be, once more, spared
Well, the thing is, it's almost an absolute certainty that Russia is aiming for a regime change, in fact this has been quietly confirmed by several Russian generals/military insiders, such as recently the admission by Lt. General of the SVR Reshetnikov (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leonid_Petrovich_Reshetnikov) he stated the following: "Lieutenant General of the SVR Reshetnikov - about the initial goals of the SVO: we were going to enter Kyiv, Kharkov, to help come to power, as it was then considered, reasonable representatives of the Ukrainian state. But what happened, happened."
So, what Russia will intend to do in the coming offensives/war, is either produce unconditional surrender of the entire AFU by destroying the army, after which Russia will have de facto control of the entire state of Ukraine, and will carry out 'regime change', cleanse the entire leadership and replace them with their own pro-Russian rulers (Medvechuk was said the likely candidate for presidency). At that point, since Russia would have powerful influence or de facto control over the new Ukrainian leadership, even though they won't annex those western lands you mention, Russia will utilize the new regime to completely and forcibly cleanse all nationalist/nazi elements from the ranks of the AFU.
Wow, very informative analysis. I thought, and still think it a factor, that Putin hoped to avoid a full on destructive war, (fellow slavs with centuries long Russian history in the Ukraine) and perhaps to some degree that has played into the modern extremely efficient target warfare you describe.
It would appear that Putin has clearly outlined the goals intended, and is working towards those goals. Perhaps it also took some time to understand that NATO would commit so heavily into it, and that has taken time to adjust to.
I agree with Yoni that the WEF One World government type goals are perhaps on the table, and Russia as a sovereign nation, not playing their one world games, is a thorn in their "wants". In retrospect it is perhaps clear that a main WEF goal was keeping Trump and Russia apart, while Trump was rebuilding global trade and inspiring rational nationalism in many nations. (COVID broke Trumps rewriting of global trade, as well as breaking global trade) I am uncertain of NATO capacity to restock what is being used in this war, as they have so heavily damaged energy capacity and manufacturing capacity.
If this is some weird Globalist shell game, and breaking sovereign nations to make a one world omelet is on the table, then their end game out of global chaos is difficult to see, as controlling chaos is not easy. The relative German and NATO silence on Nordstream is concerning. Yet much that has happened in the last decade or so is concerning. I have been thinking ( and it is disturbing indeed) the west suicidal for years. Unfettered indiscriminate immigration of millions, many that hate you, is insanely suicidal. Covid, and Covid policy is insane. The Arab spring was anything but. Leaving the Taliban with many billions of dollar of working modern military gear was incomprehensible. Energy is the life blood of EVERY economy, and the entire Climate Change doctrine https://anderdaa7.substack.com/p/global-warming policy is based on poisoning that life blood. The motive? The goal? Apparently some combination of malthusian ideology, crossed with the desire to rule. “Blue Planet in Green Shackles” The current fear and energy destruction may very well break global trade, and the global economy is incredibly interconnected, with many nations required to manufacture parts for a single product, like an I phone. The destruction of farm land and fertilizer. The suppression of effective COVID prophylactic treatments. At what point does incompetence, become competent incompetence?
Agreed. Just few remarks on the side. Destruction of AFU is one of RUS objectives in conflict with UKR. It can't be achieved if AFU retreats beyond Dnepr river. It has to be achieved in cost cautious way. Kalibrating each UKR tank sitting in Dnepropetrovsk is nonsense from cost/benefit point of view. These tanks have to come to contact line to be destroyed by ATGMs or Krasnopol shells. The same goes for howitzers, BMPs and soldiers. That may be a reason why RUS Gen Staff is not in a hurry. NATO's rather naive policy which forces UKR army to retake Donbas and Crimea (aka to inflict as biggest losses as possible on RUS army) is in reality fullfilling RUS objectives. Howitzers - UKR is losing on average 8 to 9 pieces a day since beging of 2023. I am surprised that AFU still has some of them in service after 120 days. Or do Lancets in reality destroy only 50% of what they hit? Zpaorozhie NPP - some one wrote somewhere that there were 2200 MT of spent fuel there few years ago. It may contain 0.8% of plutonium 239. 5kg of Pu239 are needed to make 5kt TNT nuclear weapon. If this spent fuel is still there it means that it contains few thousand nuclear warheads. Is this the reason why the US is so interested to put its hands on the powerplant?
Personally i always assumed the Russians had anti satellite satellites, who knows. But anyone expecting the long alleged new offensive to be 1000 tanks rampaging across the steppes is dreaming.
Im beginning to think this will just be another 5 years of grinding.
As for 1000 tanks, they won't necessarily be 'rampaging', but it's a simple fact that Russia literally has hundreds of thousands of troops sitting on the sidelines not yet committed to combat. They didn't raise those troops "for nothing". They will be committed soon and the tempo and character of the war will change drastically, you can bet on that.
Im no rocket scientist but it seems like a marble sized bb from a gas powered launcher would be enough to ruin a satellites day. (from another satellite) I really hope they would wipe some satellites out though, I feel like Homer waiting for the quiet yakuza to do something.
I think 1000's of drones rampaging across the steppes might be a thing we could see though.
One other thing I didn't mention is that Russia itself has been beefing up their 'eyes in the sky' during the course of the SMO. In the past 6 months alone, Russia has sent up something like 4-6 or maybe even more new military/recon satellites. Not sure if anyone really knows exactly what type they are, but the point is they clearly are urgently manufacturing tons of new satellite infrastructure to compete with NATO's ISR and only more will continue to be sent up. https://www.rt.com/russia/564743-russia-military-satellite-plesetsk/
Thanks, I need helpful feedback like that so it's appreciated it. I try to put most acronym type capitalizations like that as a "link" so it links to the definition but I realize I probably left a few out in haste.
One question that seems to be untouched: how in the world Western arms can still reach the front? How is it possible that the RuAF has not pulverised the complete heavy transportation infrastructure?
In my views, if the RuAF could focus on this, it would bleed out the ukies faster.
well what infrastructure exactly are you referring to? You can't pulverize every road in what is the largest country in Europe. You can't pulverize railroads either because they are famously easy to fix. A damaged railway line can take mere hours and a few hundred bucks $$ to fix while you just wasted a $1million cruise missile.
And as for targeting the actual transport vehicles themselves, most of the gear is shipped in disguised and camouflaged in civilian transport trucks. So there's not much you can do there.
The ONLY big question that COULD effectively have stopped the supplies, is destroying all the bridges over the Dnieper river. And that is possible, and it's a very nuanced topic that I explored heavily in this recent article: https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/the-coming-russian-offensive-part
scroll down to part 6 about the 'bridges' and you can get detailed thoughts on it.
Obviously you can't destroy every road. But you can certainly create choke points and (at least) some sort of disturbance. And high-load rated roads are not exactly a commodity in ukraine, neither they are so easy to repair.
The Russians can at least force ukraine's western masters to work on this infrastructure. And perhaps disturb the repair process too with a couple of well-timed CMs.
As for railroads - yes, they are not that easy to disrupt for good. But I still fail to believe that the logistic hubs they are using are that hard to find and take out eventually. It just puzzles my mind, really.
yep exactly. Only 3 or so out of the 20-30 they claimed are dead. But hey, they should keep up the good work, it probably suits Russian generals just fine to be considered 'dead' when they're actually alive because that means the SBU and other terrorist underground forces won't try to target them for elimination in some way since they're already officially "dead". It's a win-win.
Excellent analysis. As a former field artillery officer (US Army) I've wondered why Russian counter-battery fire hasn't largely shut Ukrainian artillery down given Russia's numerical and technical advantage. I will note, I've been out of that line of work for many years.
There are many aspects to this, in general as mentioned in the article, the Russian CB does regularly take out Ukrainian units but they are supplied by a constant flood of new units so it's impossible to fully neutralize them all. But also, in many frontlines where it seems Ukraine's artillery operates with impunity, there's a misconception there because those frontlines don't have any Russian forces, but rather DPR/LPR, whose artillery standards and equipment aren't the same. For instance the infamous Donetsk area where Ukrainian artillery constantly shells Donetsk, there are no Russian forces in that region so it's the DPR forced to respond and play CB games. And this goes back to my original point (enumerated bestin Part 1: https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/the-coming-russian-offensive-2023) that Russia is using a FAR smaller force than most people believed, and so their units are stretched thin and are not operating on every front.
But that's not to take credit away from AFU, as I mentioned in this article, the AFU's artillery units are second to none and now considered by many even American experts as 'best in th world', not only due to the sheer near-peer experience they've now accumulated in real combat, but the vast array of modernized equipment and munitions they operate, not to mention all the digital network-centric integration I discussed in this report.
Also their discipline in many units (not all but many) is very strong in terms of camouflaging, scoot-n-shoot and re-positioning tactics and things of that nature.
And most importantly, there is HEAVY indication that a lot of the most advanced systems are actually manned DIRECTLY by NATO forces, which operate in a fairly harm-free way from the rear. For instance, most notably there were several pieces of direct evidence that many/most of the Polish AHS Krab SPG's are operated directly by Polish servicemen. Not only is there a video of an AFU soldier outright saying that the Poles come in on their Krabs, fire off a few rounds then scram, in strict scoot-n-shoot fashion, but there was other strong evidence as well. At 1:50 of this video you can see what I'm talking about https://www.bitchute.com/video/aUHstFGzEgnH/
Good points. I've also wondered where they are finding Ukrainians to operate complex systems with which they aren't familiar. As the Russians no doubt know targeting FA command and control (fire direction centers, target acquisition, comms, etc.) would have longer term impacts on FA ops since they'd be taking out highly trained personnel and equipment which would be difficult or impossible to replace quickly.
I want to note, Ukrainian artillery personnel at all levels deserve nothing but condemnation and consequences for terrorizing civilian populations in the Donbas region. I hope those which survive suffer profoundly. It would have been my duty to refuse to carry out such heinous unlawful fire missions in the US military, and I would have refused.
Yep...and also to mention that a good portion (maybe majority at this point?) of "counter-battery" is now being done by loitering drones, at least on the Russian side. Simply because it's much easier and more effective. Everyday we get more videos of it and just today another 3 or so new ones arrived of AFU M777, 2S1 Gvozdika, and Bm-21 Grad being taken out by the Russian Lancet: https://odysee.com/@Overthrown:6/M6hhwiBZvc4qdNHP:b
https://odysee.com/@Overthrown:6/Lmlm3gOJvInO-_6T:b
https://odysee.com/@Overthrown:6/N5kYQ0u0WbLxROQm:4
In some ways that method is replacing traditional 'counter battery' and will likely only get more and more efficient in future, though of course more countermeasures against it will pop up as well: https://www.bitchute.com/video/yv7DZFpxPla1/
https://www.bitchute.com/video/jrkQea8VKNXv/
https://www.bitchute.com/video/OswBnfP2XP6H/
hell, there was a new one just since the time I posted the last message. That's 4 in one day all from Lancet drones https://odysee.com/@Overthrown:6/PK2JVs-_FbsiOZml:4
Those drones look like something of a game changer. They weren't even a notion anyone was having, that I ever heard of, while I was serving.
Well they lack a bit on power, but it's a trade off for their size/speed/endurance, and also they have cumulative warheads so it's not the raw 'explosive' effect that's doing the damage, but rather the HEAT-style penetration of a shaped charge which blasts forward melting steel and coring out enemy equipment. So it won't 'blow the wheels off' of the towed howitzer, but will slice a decent hole through its most delicately aligned parts and either make it a complete write off or take it out of action for a long time
Indeed, there a a number of critical mechanisms and sighting instruments which would be taken out by even a small shaped charge. And a SP howitzer with propelling charges and shells inside might have a really bad day. They weren't heavily armored, at least not back in my day.
Excellent information and assessments.
THank you
Thanks for the in depth explanation of what you see going on - I have not read much written about ISR in UKR but thought it would be critical.. Some of my thoughts, as an ex-FAC(A), but way out of touch these days. I think that RU has prepared it's forces for NATO/WW3, so a total war. This is why this op is called an SMO. They still need to keep their main forces and abilities prepared for war, not showing them to everyone in UKR. If they decide it is a 'war', then the NATO++ SIGINT aircraft will immediately be targeted, as will the satellites, and probably many NATO installations. So much of what we have seen could well be 'deception' through limitations on equipment and usage, thus the lessons learned may be false once war starts proper - the relatively small role of airpower for example.
You're right and a few choice 'hints' were sent recently in that respect. For instance, not only did Russia repeat the warning to take down western commercial satellites https://www.rt.com/russia/571585-quasi-civilian-satellites-nato/ but one Russian official even released a statement that, in the future if any Ukrainian/Western jets take off from the airfields of a different country, go into Ukraine to conduct a sortie/attack mission, and then go back to land at that secondary country, then the airfields of that country will become legitimate targets for Russia.
No 38th parallel here.
another awesome piece of analysis
Still reading this - fascinating insight into modern hi tech warfare. Are we reaching a point where this type of war is becoming pointless or even unthinkable?
Well to some extent that's what Gerasimov himself was getting at in his "doctrine", which is why he outlined a recommendation of 4:1 ratio of nonmilitary (political, hybrid, etc) force vs. military force in a given conflict. He believed that the direct military KINETIC portion of a conflict is almost starting to take a backseat to the other developments under the surface.
With that said, he revised this later on in light of the brewing Ukrainian war as he knew a large classical WW2 style conflict was still on the cards.
Anyway I plan to do another piece on that specific topic a bit later on, that goes more indepth in the automation and future artificial intelligence dominated warfare
One of my big misgivings from the get go has been the pr campaign against Russia and all the false claims and all Russia does is have their guy get up and say, "yesterday we killed 3 tanks 4 trucks and a helicopter. Thank you for coming."
Yeah there's a LOT to say about Russia's poor information management on the surface level. Beneath the surface, they are likely doing far more than we know of, secret hybrid war programs that are likely having major influence on things we can't even fathom, but the surface presentations leave much to be desired. Not only that but Russia's SEEMING failure to properly develop an ethos, zeitgeist or "movement" around the 'spirit' of the operation and what's happening. The Kremlin's handling of it has been criticized as clunky. For instance, in Moscow there are these sort of vapid, plain and strangely abstract military recruitment posters that just have a giant "Z" on them. But they don't galvanize the population with any proper message that shows an understanding of what the 'fight' is even about. It's this weird disconnect between the Kremlin and the ethos of what's happening. But with that said, too many people jump to a polar extreme, just because something isn't done 100% well, they immediately sensationalize it and say it's being down "100% negatively". Truth is, the Kremlin's handling is not absolutely horrible, it's just not as well done as it could be. There's merit in grading something realistically and maybe they get a C, or B- or something but not necessarily an F or even D because, after all, they HAVE at least galvanized a lot of popular support in an effective way, and even with recent criticisms and 'controversies', new polls still show an iron 78% + support of Putin/Gov't. They just haven't found the true heart and spirit of this conflict yet, due to some of the failures of it, they've waffled around from idea to idea, and ideologically and metaphysically they're clumsily groping at answers.
I would say the Russians are winning the information war with the only people that matter: The Global South. This is where the bulk of the world's population and resources are. The West is on the way out, it's elites so divorced from reality and their constituents that violent change is on order.
yep this is quite true, and is the other big argument on this topic. Although one could say by far the most important audience to win the hearts and minds of is the domestic Russian one. And while Russia has won them in general just based on the sheer enmity and racism the West has shown the Russian people, it sort of is natural for them to support the Russian gov't and SMO during this time. BUT Rus gov't still could have done far better in not just vaguely getting their support but building more of a cohesive ideological vision in line with what I mentioned in the above post. This is a bit of a failing but like I said still more of a win than a fail in general.
And you're right, if anything, the west is now devolving into a bizarre pathological mass psychosis in regard to Russian affairs so even if Russia is "losing" the information war in the West, it's sort of a poison pill or trojan horse because the West is also losing by so psychotically embracing their Russophobia, they are devouring themselves and rotting their own souls, creating an ever deeper cesspit of perversion, deceit, and immorality amongst themselves. In many ways that alone is a big victory for Russia
Yes, Russian flags have appeared among crowds in Africa and elsewhere. The anti-imperialist struggle against banksterism and its entourage of cronies proceeds. The west's financial gyrations around the plug hole are proceeding: failure abroad, repression at home.
It seems impossible to understand this war thinking of Ukraine as the primary battlefield. In 5GW narrative drives kinetics, not the reverse. Ukraine and what happens there (or Sudan) are the tip of the iceberg. How is the world economic order being reshaped? How is Russia leveraging the BRICS to isolate the US? How are weak points in NATO/EU being leveraged to create conflict in the opposition? What is the state of the Petro-dollar?
You're right about Gerasimov and his 4:1 ratio. Modern warfare unfolds asymmetricly. We think the main battlefield is Ukraine. Certainly thinkers like Brzezinski or Kagan wanted that. While Ukraine is important and what's happening there is tragic, the real tell for how the war is going seems to be Saudi Arabia, China, and India. That is where Russia is waging information war the West doesn't really censor because so far the US doesn't even think the BRICS world worthwhile to pay attention to. The US still uses sanctions like the rest of the world has no choice or voice.
Russia isn't fighting hard in the West. Why fight for a population's perception when something like Nord Stream can take place and Europe still ties itself to the US. There is no point to contending that space. Russia is effective where the world is receptive, outside the West.
The US and Ukraine lost when the Saudi's said they would trade oil for other currencies besides dollars. Ukraine is showing the world the unilateral world has died. The most powerful, most funded military and its alliance cannot put Russia to bed. In the West the analysts are saying it took Russia 9 months to take Bakhmut. Meanwhile, over half the world is watching, realizing that the greatest military on earth with all its technology could not use Ukraine to shut Russia down. It doesn't matter what the West thinks. It matters where Gerasimov 4 to 1 are being used. Those 4 are loud and clear outside the West.
Wow ! thank you for this detailed overview of ISR. I know absolutely nothing about military matters, but you have provided me with an appreciation of just how technical and complex a modern battfield is. Keep up the good work.
Hi, lot's of interesting information and analysis.
One part did cause me to raise a few eyebrows though, when you talked about the 'Gerasimov Doctrine'. To the best of my knowledge, it doesn't exist. The notion was invented by the west (Mark Galeotti to be more precise, after which the MSM and intelligence services ran with it), to be able to point to Russia as the evil mastermind behind whatever bad happened in the world ("it's Russian hybrid warfare! It's Russian meddling/interfering! That's what they do, they have a whole doctrine for it!"), and by attaching Gerasimov's name to it, they tried to label the very thing they were doing themselves (colour revolutions, coups, rigging elections, assassinating people, spreading disinformation through manipulated media, etc) as something foreign, and Russian in particular.
They didn't invent this notion out of thin air, there was something akin to this which was much older, the Primakov Doctrine. That was focused on foreign policy and Russia's place in the world, and not a military policy or doctrine.
Gerasimov in turn, wrote an article in February 2013 called 'the value of science in prediction' (that's the translation at least), in the 'Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kurier' (I hope I got that name right). It's not a long article, and in it he describes how the rules of war have changed, and how as a result the classical distinction between military operations and civilian ones have become so blurred that it's no longer valid to distinguish them at all. He does this based on what the West had been doing (Arab, spring, colour revolutions, etc), and describes, in general terms, what challenges that poses for the traditional military.
There's two graphic's in his article, one called 'Change in the character of warfare - Achievement of political goals' and the other is 'The Role of Nonmilitary Methods in the Resolution of Interstate Conflicts - The primary phases (stages) of conflict development'. It is analytical in nature, it is not proscribing anything like a practical doctrine.
The article was published in a, by western standards, rather obscure publication, and was pretty much missed by mainstream annalists in the west, until Mark Galeotti picked it up, who recognised the author, and who was instantly intrigued. He then wrote an article about it, came up with the name 'Gerasomiv Doctrine' and pretty much made up a lot of stuff that's not in the original article. Now his article did catch the attention of the rest of the western media pack, and like 'chinese whispers', his article got twisted and subverted in turn, leading to the purely western invention now paraded as the 'Gerasimov Doctrine'.
Galeotti wrote another article a couple of years ago, in which he apologised for having invented the term and inadvertently created a shitstorm based on a lie.
Oh yes, I'm aware--that's what I was referring to where I mentioned the 'controversy' surrounding the doctrine. BUT, the thing is, when Gerasimov made his presentation (yes, he didn't write an article, the article was a translation of a speech/presentation Gerasimov made to the Academy of Military Sciences), he outlined a bunch of these hybrid war topics in 2013 right on the eve of Russia's incursions into both Ukraine (Crimea - 2014) and Syria (2015). And Russia's actions utilized exactly the strictures he seemed to outline in his speech, thus crystallizing the fact that Gerasimov was in fact verbalizing the emergence of a new internal doctrine for the Russian armed forces. After all, it's a bit too 'coincidental' for him to make such a landmark speech, naming specific hybrid scenarios, and then utilize them for the first time only months later (and he himself recognized it wasn't used before, as in his very speech he admitted that Georgia 2008 was in some ways a failure of these modern methods).
So, is it an official emblemized doctrine, no, but did Russia actually mark a very critical shift in doctrinal approach, particularly when they took Crimea in an extremely surprising and successful enactment of 'hybrid war'? Yes. And did Gerasimov herald this new era in his speech? It seems so. Thus, in a sort of unofficial and informal way, it becomes cemented into history as his 'doctrine' despite not being an official one. And beyond the pointless semantic points of whether it's his doctrine or not, the main point remains which is that the guy currently put in charge of the armed forces is the one who, officially or unofficially, marked an important doctrinal shift in Russian military culture toward modern next generational warfare. And so the point I was simply making is, that's a favorable sign for future Russian military actions and coming offensives.
Sorry, I should have realised you were aware of the origins of the term. But I do take exception of using the term 'Gerasimov Doctrine' as if it is a genuine in Russian military doctrine, while there is no such thing.
There are if you like, two very different, even opposed, policies/doctrines which you refer to under the same name. There is the fictitious 'Gerasimov Doctrine', which as I said was invented by the west, to paint Russia as the bad guy with regards to who's responsible for hybrid warfare acts around the world. It strongly implies (and many even describe explicitly as such) an radical change in military posture and the manner in which war is waged, and here's the crucial bit, and that it is actively being waged by the owner of the 'doctrine'. Which here would the Russians, through Gerasimov. This is purported to be an active 'doctrine' that Russia is said to be continuously waging against the west, hence the link that is made with the Primakov Doctrine (which did exist).
Secondly, there is the slow and gradual change (as opposed to the radical change implied by the word 'doctrine') in dealing with potential threats to the nation that the Russian military and security apparatus have been engaged in. This latter is nothing new, but a constant throughout history. Gerasimov in 2013 identified some of the newly arising threats as they are emerging in this century. Again, nothing new, the content of the emerging threats may be new, but conducting the threat assessment itself is pretty much part of his job description. And as his predecessors, it is his responsibility to adjust existing policies or come up with new ones to address these new threats. This by itself is just part of his job, business as usual, and by itself does not qualify as a 'doctrine' or doctrinal change.
The two interpretations differ fundamentally from each other, as the fake 'Gerasimov Doctrine' is formulated in such a way as to make Russia the aggressor, the one waging hybrid warfare. This doctrine is portrayed as an active one, one constantly being waged upon the west, and against which the west needs to defend itself. It's a threat the west invented to scare its own people into further submission. It's a new iteration of the 'Red Scare' propaganda.
But the actual, gradual, change in security posture and policy of Russia under Gerasimov is the opposite! It is defensive in nature, and aimed to protect Russia against the kind of hybrid warfare the west has been waging for decades now. It is reactive in nature, not active. That is what Gerasimov referred to in 2013, and that is what they did in Syria and Crimea, reactive measures against hybrid warfare waged AGAINST Russia (and its vital interests).
The west has pulled the same trick over and over again, and they did it here too. They proactively assign to their adversaries what they do themselves. We've seen this kind of projection all the time in the SMO from the Ukrainians and western MSM/'experts'. The accuse Russia in advance of what they do themselves, thereby lessening the impact of the counter-accusations and obfuscating what's really happening.
By using the term 'Gerasimov Doctrine' you are, inadvertently as it seems, legitimising the made-up western interpretation that paints Russia as the perpetrator of hybrid warfare around the world. That's what triggered me. The two are very different, and should not be referred to by the same name. In fact, the phrase 'Gerasimov Doctrine' should completely disappear, as it is tainted beyond repair.
Finally, to support my points, I would like to point to Russia's poor efforts, if not outright failure, on the hybrid battlefield prior to and during most of the SMO. It lost the PR war in the west right away, and Russia media still can't reach any audience there, nor do Russian voices have any access to mainstream western media. They struggled at first to win over audiences outside the west too, and when and where they did, it was largely thanks to classical diplomacy and economic policies, which didn't differ all that much from what they were doing anyway. No radical shift there either.
And Russia has consistently been the victim of hybrid warfare, not the perpetrator (Nordstream bombing, Kerch bridge, and a range of sabotage attacks and assassinations in both Russia and the formerly Ukrainian territories). So either Russia has been so good at its own hybrid warfare that we (including the western media/militaries/intelligence services) don't even recognise it when they commit 'hybrid warfare' against the west, or the far more likely explanation, that they're not very good at it, if they wage it at all. And that more likely explanation very strongly implies no doctrinal shift at all under Gerasimov, but rather the gradual accommodation of already existing security capabilities to the new emerging threats (see Crimea and Syria), instead of creating new and conceptually different capabilities, as the 'Gerasimov Docrine' would have us believe.
Well you make some good points so I respect your views on it.
But for the hybrid warfare, I do suspect that Russia is carrying out far more than people know about. Not only in the 'cultural sphere' but even asymmetric warfare in the sense of sabotage and such similar to the Kerch. After all, in a previous article I pointed out the rather 'coincidental' destruction of almost all 152mm ammo factories in neighboring eastern european countries like Czech, Romania, Bulgaria. I don't think this is some 3rd party "doing Russia a favor" if you get my drift.
^ This is what constructive disagreement looks like. Kudos to both Simplicius and Flabbergaster.
To Simplicius: thank you for this post and the series to which it belongs. It is illuminating to this non-professional, fleshing out concepts I've encountered in the past year when reading or listening to, to pick a few, Martyanov, Big Serge here on Substack, Bernard from Moon of Alabama, MacGregor, Ritter, Johnson, McGovern, Mercouris, and Bertelec. I'm not ready to throw around part numbers and acronyms, but I may better understand events because of your efforts and those of others.
To Flabbergaster: On your points about the so-called Gerasimov Doctrine I'm inclined to agree. The West rarely misses an opportunity to conduct operations via public relations, the aim of which is, as Herman and Chomsky memorably put it, the manufacture of consent. In that form of "industrial" warfare the West seems far ahead, though I say that from within the propaganda bubble of the Western sphere; apparently in the rest of the world that bubble has lost a bit of its volume. Needless to say, propaganda techniques are incompatible with the informed consent necessary for democratic legitimacy, a fine point that seemingly eludes Western officials and media pretending to represent a clear alternative to autocracy.
Thanks. Yeah, I try not to be 'dogmatic' about things and usually am not a fan of commentators/bloggers/etc who are 'certain' they are right about a given topic. I only present my own well researched views, but don't try to push them down others' throats like an ideologue etc. And technically what Flabbergaster is saying is true that there is no real 'Doctrine' per se and it's also true they used the misattribution as part of their ongoing propaganda war to demonize Russia. But I was merely using it more as 'shorthand' to simply convey the point that whether it's an official doctrine or not, Gerasimov proved with his presentation, that he has his 'ear to the ground' in light of recent military developments and revolutions, and that therefore, he is likely a capable commander.
That seems right about Gerasimov.
On propaganda, I'd love to read a spin doctor's handbook along the lines of "Confessions of an Economic Hitman." Clearly officials know well how to get ahead of stories and deflect blame by accusing others of what they're up to. It's like a crook who yells "Stop, thief!" to get a crowd to look the other way while he walks off with your wallet. It's somewhat like what psychologists call projection, but that's an unconscious defense, whereas what I'm describing is a conscious tool for manipulation. Gaslighting comes closer, since its intent is FUD things up. Just now I also found "accusation in a mirror," the heading of Wikipedia page on this subject. It features a quote from Goebbels, which I'll adapt for the sake of generality: The cleverest trick used in propaganda is to accuse our enemies of what we ourselves are doing. That may be what Flabbergaster is getting at and why he felt it was worth mentioning. It doesn't detract from the piece. In fact your conversation with him adds to it.
Thanks,
maybe you'd like to contribute to a little collaborative effort I proposed (see the other reply I made in this thread). All suggestions are welcome, and please, do feel free to criticise my points! That's how I learn.
I can sense my own views slightly shifting already. ;-)
I'm very glad to see your blog evolving into one where we can have constructive debates, and as Dingusansich put it, have constructive disagreement. By exposing ourselves to different viewpoints, arguments other than the ones we use, and facts we may have overlooked, we allow ourselves to learn and grow. It is impossible to do that if you do not first accept you might be wrong on something.
With regards to hybrid warfare, I make the following distinctions, and that drives my thinking on it:
1) proactive or offensive (intended to harm the enemy) versus reactive or defensive (intended to protect against the enemy's proactive use of hybrid warfare).
2) Accommodation/adjusting of existing capabilities to conduct either proactive or reactive hybrid warfare versus the development of conceptually new capabilities.
(By the way, why you mention 'waging hybrid warfare' I automatically assume you are referring explicitly to proactive acts, not merely reactive ones. Is that correct?)
For a practical doctrinal shift to have occurred within the Russian military, and not just a theoretical one, we would need to see evidence of all four, so both old and new capabilities used in both proactive and reactive ways. And we would have to see a significant amount of it, in ways that truly make a difference, across a wide spectrum of applications.
In addition, if we can see a lack of certain expected capabilities, or the exclusive use of traditional means in certain situations, that absence is indicative of a lack of doctrinal shift. Obviously there's no clear marker to tell us if the shift in Russia's stance regarding is 'doctrinal' or 'incremental'. I strongly believe it is the latter.
I think what would be interesting is to see if we can come up with a list of examples that would qualify either as the presence of hybrid warfare capabilities or the lack of it where we would have expected it. We can then qualify them according to the above criteria. I think it could prove to be a nice collaborative effort. I'll start us off:
1. Proactive and New capability
- Wagner, in particular it's use in Africa and the Middle East
At the moment, this is the only clear example I can see of a conceptually new capability that is being proactively used in a hybrid manner (in kicking France out of Africa, for example)
2. Proactive and Existing (if adjusted) capability
- Taking out ammunition factories in Eastern Europe
- Economic measures tailored to do very specific harm to western economies and the uni-polar order (de-dollarisation for example)
3. Reactive and New capabilities
- Anti-drone air defence capabilities (partly thanks to lessons learned in Syria)
4. Reactive and Existing (if adjusted) capability
- the use of VDV as 'polite green men' in Crimea to prevent the (by then) by their own declaration independent Crimea
- 'Inoculation' of the own population against western propaganda aimed at instigating colour revolutions
- Diplomacy and economic policies to win over nations and people outside the western world
- Military intervention in Syria to prevent western trained/created terrorist organisations taking over the country
- Sanction-proofing the economy prior to the SMO
5. Absent capabilities we would have expected to see
- No meaningful (small) drone capability to speak, no integration of drones at tactical levels, lagging behind both the DPR/LPR and Ukraine at start of SMO
- No meaningful media channels to reach international audiences, leaving many in the world, including most of the west, completely ignorant of Russia's arguments and open to hearing just one side
- Initially very poor communicative skills by the MoD, often leaving many wondering what was going on.
- Little to no apparent support for Russian based alternatives to social media (such as Twitter, YouTube, etc), in particular towards foreign audiences.
As you can see, most of the things I can come up with myself are either reactive with existing capabilities in nature or examples of absent capabilities, hence my own earlier conclusions. But let's park any conclusions for now though, and see if we can add some more to these categories and then try to figure out what that tells us?
Thought of another example:
3. Reactive and New capability
- Creation of a new Military Police Force, specifically trained for peacekeeping/enforcing type of operations, deployed with great success in Syria.
Hi,
I just realised that this 'Gerasimvo Doctrine', whether it's the fake western one or the real Russian adaptations, is pretty much a contradiction in terms.
Gerasimov is the chief-of-staff of Russia's armed forces, yet the whole notion of this new type of warfare is mostly about using non-military means to fight conflicts with enemies. In other words, using capabilities that are NOT under the control of the Russian military and NOT Gerasimov's to use or develop. If you look at the list of examples I put up earlier, the only one that does fall under his purview was the use of VDV troops as 'polite men' in Crimea, and possibly the creation of the new military police force (although I suspect they fall under a different chain of command within the MoD).
I think that was largely his point in 2013 with his speech. He was addressing not so much the military, but other institutions in Russia that also needed to step up. And if he said this publicly in 2013, he likely would have been saying it indoors for much longer. Most of the tools for waging this hybrid warfare fall outside his ability to control, and the apparent lack of Russia's capabilities in many of its aspects should not be blamed on him, nor is it his responsibility to create these capabilities, because the point of hybrid warfare is to use NON-military means.
Going by the snippets Simplicius gives here, I'd say that what is called in the West the 'Gerasimov Doctrine' should be more accurately described as a report of a study. A military paper, not to be confused with Russia's military doctrine.
You're right, although to be even MORE precise, what it actually was in essence was a request to the academy of russian military science for them to 'explore' this new modern way of war. He lists many of the strictures of this style of war himself, but then he outright tells them that the point of his presentation is for the military-science community of Russia to expand on the framework/groundwork that he laid, and see what they can come up with to ensure that Russia continues to stay ahead of the game in the 21st century. So in general, it was more of a 'call to action'.
Because some one wrote it does not mean its doctrine and been practiced. I would love to see the Russian equivalent of NTC or an JRTC… are they now calling it Ukraine?
Well considering I outlined how it WAS practiced immediately after the conceptualization of the theories, but you might've missed that part.
Eventually these capabilities will lead to a LOT of space junk floating around. Russia is already sounding the alarm on this issue. Using civilian assets only brings this eventuality about faster. NATO really needs to think long and hard about this one, as they could quickly screw themselves in the event space goes hot.
Humanity simply doesn't have the capability to "clean" space. Even a tiny bolt or nut at orbital velocity is unstoppable by anything that we can currently put into space. We are many generations away from understanding gravity enough to leverage it to do work.
Yes this is the 'Kesslerization' thesis I mentioned in the report https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kessler_syndrome
it's the phenomenon of a chain reaction occurring from destroying a certain amount of satellites, whereby the debris continues spreading and destroying OTHER satellites which creates even more debris which basically snowballs or avalanches exponentially to the point where EVERYTHING in earth orbit is completely demolished and 'kesslerized' and space orbit becomes utterly unusable for many generations.
There is the risk that if U.S. pushes Russia into defending itself by shooting down several (or more) satellites, then such a catastrophic chain reaction could occur and ruin space forever for everyone.
"...a catastrophic chain reaction could occur and ruin space forever for everyone."
Would that be a bad thing? I am of the belief that homo sapiens don't belong there. Mining for resources on Mars? Moon bases? Pffft.
Fantastic article by the way. As are all of your previous are.
As the shade of Gen. Ulysses Grant allow me address this familiar logistics problem. How far away did you say the enemy artillery was? Deploy your best forces at the most propitious points and initiate a series of sweeping and powerful assaults. Move decisively to seize and destroy the enemy artillery where it is.
Why ever would you sit and allow your positions to be hit to disadvatage? Move at once. I would send Gen. Sheridan to sweep around the flank and make the enemy position untenable. All this slow-mo stuff is why Gen. McClellan failed to prevail.
The problem is you assume there IS a 'flank'. The frontline is heavily fortified in a straight line (conceptually speaking) so there is no "flanking" of the artillery positions. In order to flank them, you have to first create massive breakthroughs of the 1st echelon defense somewhere, and then penetrate deep into the 'rears' of the enemy. However the AFU as standard doctrine operates minimum of 3 echelon defense lines. That means after the first powerful line (replete with trenches, fortifications, and the whole works), there is a SECOND trench line full of powerful defenses, and then a 3rd behind that. Good luck penetrating all 3 and "flanking" anything, it will typically result in the attacking force being crowded into a killbox.
With that said, there are certainly areas where certain points are weaker than others that COULD be exploited and this is where ISR plays a key role, Russian forces are constantly probing in various directions and using various techniques like recon-by-fire and 'Recon-Pull' methods in order to identify weak areas to TRY and create breakthroughs of the sort you describe, but it's not easy
You make a flank. That's the point. If, at the outset, Russia had deployed sufficient of its professional infantry, like the First Guards Tank Army, they would have overwhelmed the over-matched Ukrainians. There would have been No intact defense lines in short order. As Grant often said, a good commander makes his own opportunities. With air control and moveable armour the Russians could have advanced faster than their enemy could have retreated. All the artillery et al would have been rolled up. End of problem.
The current Russian lilly-dipping strategy certainly is economic in the short run but dragging out the whole business has ratcheted up the total costs for both sides. This was Grant's point about the apparent costs of his Overland Campaign. Three years of lilly-dipping had cost far more. Also, and arguably more important, the political advantage to Russia of blasting straight through to Transnistria would be great. The Big Fait Accompli. Howl all you want EU. And such initiative really encourages hostile parties to be very cautious. And the rest of the world would see Nato mightily humbled. That's worth a few Corps.
Uki and Russian forces remember well the battle at Kursk. Echeloned defense in depth. Works every time.
Sure. If you got enough to echelon. Otherwise, you get trapped in your own entrenchments.
Excellent piece. Great perspectives.
I wonder if we aren't deliberating over a cold dish, so to speak?
In some respects NATO has signaled that they are resigned to Ukr's defeat and are transitioning to Plan B (or C or D if you like). Generally speaking this means, make a show of supplying Ukr w weapons etc to ensure they dont quit or capitulate, while prepping for a long and determined effort to sabotage and bleed Russia by asymmetric means in whatever final shape Ukr takes after Russian victory.
The thing we must understand about the Globalist mindset is that it's not about victory or defeat per se. It's about power and control of their own captive populations. Russia, Ukr, China, Iran....all just tools to use for controlling domestic opinion and behaviors.
So the ultimate problem for Russia is how to secure real peace against a fanatical global cartel intent on world denomination at almost any cost. It's the reverse of the Cold War. Russia must outlast the Globalistas and wait for their corrupt system to collapse.
That's true. They have signaled what you said and instead have focused now on terrorist actions within Russia as it was just announced they intend to create terror armies https://www.rt.com/news/565973-uk-spies-train-ukraine-secret-terror-army/
https://www.rt.com/russia/571391-us-recruits-terrorists-target-russia/
to escalate infrastructure attacks deep inside Russia.
With that said, Russia's next actions (by way of the coming offensive) are still critical in that they need to show a decisive progress and deliver a major psychological blow otherwise, I fear that NATO/EU will bolster their confidence and enthusiasm and recommit to completely militarizing Ukraine and pouring endless cash/aid etc to it.
So despite these signals of flagging commitment on their behalf, I do think Russia still has a lot of pressure riding on them to show a very decisive blow in the next 2-3 months with this offensive
Neither Russia's nor Nato goals are clear in this conflict. Denazification is impossible since Russia will not occupy Galitzia or Ruthenia. On the other hand, Nato's goal of taking back Crimea is also impossible. Russia could be aiming to take all lands east of the Dnipr river which is a reasonable long term strategic goal for stability. But Nato's adamant refusal of diplomacy or negotiations could hide a multilayered purpose. First, to destroy all Eastern Europe, including Poland and the Baltics, in order to create a buffer desert zone to isolate the rest of Europe from Russia. But going further a faction of the hidden powers that be ( basically cyclopean capitals hidden in tax havens) could be targeting a total destruction of ALL adversaries, in order to rebuild the world by brand new global institutions that will be presented as the guardians of perpetual peace. Think about it. Their fake economic schemes are collapsing by the day. When the bubble burst, they will need to divert the people's attention in order to get away with their countless crimes. Boris Johnson by the way, with his Churchillian imperial brain, looks like he wants the whole Europe destroyed, assuming that Britain will be, once more, spared
Well, the thing is, it's almost an absolute certainty that Russia is aiming for a regime change, in fact this has been quietly confirmed by several Russian generals/military insiders, such as recently the admission by Lt. General of the SVR Reshetnikov (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leonid_Petrovich_Reshetnikov) he stated the following: "Lieutenant General of the SVR Reshetnikov - about the initial goals of the SVO: we were going to enter Kyiv, Kharkov, to help come to power, as it was then considered, reasonable representatives of the Ukrainian state. But what happened, happened."
So, what Russia will intend to do in the coming offensives/war, is either produce unconditional surrender of the entire AFU by destroying the army, after which Russia will have de facto control of the entire state of Ukraine, and will carry out 'regime change', cleanse the entire leadership and replace them with their own pro-Russian rulers (Medvechuk was said the likely candidate for presidency). At that point, since Russia would have powerful influence or de facto control over the new Ukrainian leadership, even though they won't annex those western lands you mention, Russia will utilize the new regime to completely and forcibly cleanse all nationalist/nazi elements from the ranks of the AFU.
Wow, very informative analysis. I thought, and still think it a factor, that Putin hoped to avoid a full on destructive war, (fellow slavs with centuries long Russian history in the Ukraine) and perhaps to some degree that has played into the modern extremely efficient target warfare you describe.
It would appear that Putin has clearly outlined the goals intended, and is working towards those goals. Perhaps it also took some time to understand that NATO would commit so heavily into it, and that has taken time to adjust to.
I agree with Yoni that the WEF One World government type goals are perhaps on the table, and Russia as a sovereign nation, not playing their one world games, is a thorn in their "wants". In retrospect it is perhaps clear that a main WEF goal was keeping Trump and Russia apart, while Trump was rebuilding global trade and inspiring rational nationalism in many nations. (COVID broke Trumps rewriting of global trade, as well as breaking global trade) I am uncertain of NATO capacity to restock what is being used in this war, as they have so heavily damaged energy capacity and manufacturing capacity.
If this is some weird Globalist shell game, and breaking sovereign nations to make a one world omelet is on the table, then their end game out of global chaos is difficult to see, as controlling chaos is not easy. The relative German and NATO silence on Nordstream is concerning. Yet much that has happened in the last decade or so is concerning. I have been thinking ( and it is disturbing indeed) the west suicidal for years. Unfettered indiscriminate immigration of millions, many that hate you, is insanely suicidal. Covid, and Covid policy is insane. The Arab spring was anything but. Leaving the Taliban with many billions of dollar of working modern military gear was incomprehensible. Energy is the life blood of EVERY economy, and the entire Climate Change doctrine https://anderdaa7.substack.com/p/global-warming policy is based on poisoning that life blood. The motive? The goal? Apparently some combination of malthusian ideology, crossed with the desire to rule. “Blue Planet in Green Shackles” The current fear and energy destruction may very well break global trade, and the global economy is incredibly interconnected, with many nations required to manufacture parts for a single product, like an I phone. The destruction of farm land and fertilizer. The suppression of effective COVID prophylactic treatments. At what point does incompetence, become competent incompetence?
Agreed. Just few remarks on the side. Destruction of AFU is one of RUS objectives in conflict with UKR. It can't be achieved if AFU retreats beyond Dnepr river. It has to be achieved in cost cautious way. Kalibrating each UKR tank sitting in Dnepropetrovsk is nonsense from cost/benefit point of view. These tanks have to come to contact line to be destroyed by ATGMs or Krasnopol shells. The same goes for howitzers, BMPs and soldiers. That may be a reason why RUS Gen Staff is not in a hurry. NATO's rather naive policy which forces UKR army to retake Donbas and Crimea (aka to inflict as biggest losses as possible on RUS army) is in reality fullfilling RUS objectives. Howitzers - UKR is losing on average 8 to 9 pieces a day since beging of 2023. I am surprised that AFU still has some of them in service after 120 days. Or do Lancets in reality destroy only 50% of what they hit? Zpaorozhie NPP - some one wrote somewhere that there were 2200 MT of spent fuel there few years ago. It may contain 0.8% of plutonium 239. 5kg of Pu239 are needed to make 5kt TNT nuclear weapon. If this spent fuel is still there it means that it contains few thousand nuclear warheads. Is this the reason why the US is so interested to put its hands on the powerplant?
Personally i always assumed the Russians had anti satellite satellites, who knows. But anyone expecting the long alleged new offensive to be 1000 tanks rampaging across the steppes is dreaming.
Im beginning to think this will just be another 5 years of grinding.
Yes there are some rumors about things like this: https://asiatimes.com/2022/08/russias-kosmos-2558-may-hunt-and-kill-us-spy-satellites/
As for 1000 tanks, they won't necessarily be 'rampaging', but it's a simple fact that Russia literally has hundreds of thousands of troops sitting on the sidelines not yet committed to combat. They didn't raise those troops "for nothing". They will be committed soon and the tempo and character of the war will change drastically, you can bet on that.
Im no rocket scientist but it seems like a marble sized bb from a gas powered launcher would be enough to ruin a satellites day. (from another satellite) I really hope they would wipe some satellites out though, I feel like Homer waiting for the quiet yakuza to do something.
I think 1000's of drones rampaging across the steppes might be a thing we could see though.
Great article. I have been puzzling over how an offensive can be conducted in the face of this unblinking eye over the whole battlefield.
One other thing I didn't mention is that Russia itself has been beefing up their 'eyes in the sky' during the course of the SMO. In the past 6 months alone, Russia has sent up something like 4-6 or maybe even more new military/recon satellites. Not sure if anyone really knows exactly what type they are, but the point is they clearly are urgently manufacturing tons of new satellite infrastructure to compete with NATO's ISR and only more will continue to be sent up. https://www.rt.com/russia/564743-russia-military-satellite-plesetsk/
Please don't use capitalisations without first defining them! Thank you.
Thanks, I need helpful feedback like that so it's appreciated it. I try to put most acronym type capitalizations like that as a "link" so it links to the definition but I realize I probably left a few out in haste.
One question that seems to be untouched: how in the world Western arms can still reach the front? How is it possible that the RuAF has not pulverised the complete heavy transportation infrastructure?
In my views, if the RuAF could focus on this, it would bleed out the ukies faster.
well what infrastructure exactly are you referring to? You can't pulverize every road in what is the largest country in Europe. You can't pulverize railroads either because they are famously easy to fix. A damaged railway line can take mere hours and a few hundred bucks $$ to fix while you just wasted a $1million cruise missile.
And as for targeting the actual transport vehicles themselves, most of the gear is shipped in disguised and camouflaged in civilian transport trucks. So there's not much you can do there.
The ONLY big question that COULD effectively have stopped the supplies, is destroying all the bridges over the Dnieper river. And that is possible, and it's a very nuanced topic that I explored heavily in this recent article: https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/the-coming-russian-offensive-part
scroll down to part 6 about the 'bridges' and you can get detailed thoughts on it.
I agree - sort of :)
Obviously you can't destroy every road. But you can certainly create choke points and (at least) some sort of disturbance. And high-load rated roads are not exactly a commodity in ukraine, neither they are so easy to repair.
The Russians can at least force ukraine's western masters to work on this infrastructure. And perhaps disturb the repair process too with a couple of well-timed CMs.
As for railroads - yes, they are not that easy to disrupt for good. But I still fail to believe that the logistic hubs they are using are that hard to find and take out eventually. It just puzzles my mind, really.
Another Zombie General back from the dead:
https://twitter.com/mdfzeh/status/1626527890794766336
With the way Russia keeps necromancing Generals, a Ship Captain, and a few others, we need to be scared of Russian skills in necromancy...
...
...
Of course only 3 Russian Generals were ever confirmed to have died.
yep exactly. Only 3 or so out of the 20-30 they claimed are dead. But hey, they should keep up the good work, it probably suits Russian generals just fine to be considered 'dead' when they're actually alive because that means the SBU and other terrorist underground forces won't try to target them for elimination in some way since they're already officially "dead". It's a win-win.