SITREP 12/16/24: Negotiations Talk Curdles as Ukraine Loses More Territory
Last friday Russia again launched a series of devastating energy grid attacks, proving once more that the latest campaign is in fact a systematic one to disable Ukraine’s grid rather than reflexive retaliation:
The strikes were followed by immediate reports that as much as 70% of Ukraine was without power, at least temporarily. It seems with each strike the system is buckling but it’s uncertain if it can or will ever fully ‘collapse’, nor if Russia even intends for it to do so—as opposed to bringing it just to the brink.
Despite claims Gerasimov had spoken to head of Joint Chiefs of Staff Charles Brown and that ATACMS strikes subsequently immediately stopped on Russian territory, Ukraine in fact launched another ATACMS strike on Taganrog, between Mariupol and Rostov. Perhaps there’s chance Gerasimov’s warning really did result in a moratorium but Zelensky decided to ‘test the limits’ of both sides’ red lines. After all, the target (geolocation: 47.23737, 38.86234) is mere kilometers from the Ukrainian border and just ‘barely’ constitutes ‘Russian territory’. Why waste a “long range” ATACMS to strike at such a shallow depth unless you were hoping to sit on two chairs and cause a provocation without angering your ‘partners’ too much?
Either way, the MOD claimed negligible damage as the ATACMS were reportedly both shot down and deflected by EW.
Trump has now stated allowing ATACMS to be launched into Russia was a big mistake:
Now as we get closer and closer to Trump’s term, Ukraine scrambles for any propaganda edge possible. There are now even rumors that Zelensky plans to launch another ‘Christmas offensive’ into some remote part of the Russian border—perhaps Bryansk, or elsewhere in Belgorod region. There are ‘claims’ of Ukrainian buildups with photos of a new “tactical sign” on vehicles.
This is not the first time that the Ukrainian Armed Forces have displayed a new tactical sign - a white square - in the border area of the Kursk region. Similar signs began to appear about 10 days ago.
In this regard, rumors that have arisen recently about an allegedly new planned Ukrainian offensive in the Russian border region - again in Kursk, then either in Bryansk or Belgorod regions - are further fueled.
It is worth remembering that before the invasion of the Kursk region, the Ukrainian Armed Forces carried out major information operations designed to mislead the Russian command about their true intentions, so it is not yet worth drawing far-reaching conclusions based on the emerging bits of data.
The problem is these are already being hit, as can be seen above—so it’s questionable if they’re being saved for some new operation. Secondly, the new 150-series reserve brigades Zelensky was putting together for future operations have been marred with problems. A new report highlighted how 1000 men have already deserted the 155th of this series, not to mention confirming that the brigades have already been utilized merely to fill gaps in critical areas of the Donbass theater.
That said, Ukrainian channels continue to spread rumors that the next offensive will even reach Moscow:
While the Russians think they're winning, we're preparing an incredibly powerful strike force. Our reconnaissance battles in Belgorod and Kursk, as a result of which we killed a lot of orcs and captured a lot of territory, will seem to everyone just a warm-up. We will reach Kursk city this time judging by the combat power and the quantity and quality of tanks, drones and aircraft. It will be very, very painful and bitter for Russia. They will suck.
Moscow will be possible to be reached. I won't give you a timeframe so as not to spoil the surprise. But orders have already been given.
👉 Ukrainian Post
A more realistic and fact-based assessment was given by a top Russian channel:
The Archangel of Special Forces writes about the preparation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for the offensive in the Kursk and Belgorod directions.
In the city of Shostka, Sumy region, recently had to arrive reinforcements of the Armed Forces of Ukraine - about 13 thousand people. However, the group disappeared halfway to Shostka and its traces are lost in the region. Also, throughout November and December, the media show footage of the transfer of echelons with equipment from NATO countries: "Bradley", armored cars from Sweden," Strikers","Leopards". Where this equipment settles is similarly unknown. In Poland and Romania, from 24 to 34 F-16 aircraft have been accumulated and are already flying from there to intercept our cruise missiles. They are clearly being saved for a mass debut.
Indirectly, judging by the small consumption of ATACMS, Storm Shadow and SCALP missiles that attacked the Kursk region and Taganrog, these missiles accumulate. Given all this, as well as frosts closer to the end of the month and freezing of the soil, the APU strike is expected in the middle of winter.
Russia on the other hand is also rumored to be building up new strike forces in the Zaporozhye direction:
⚡️Ukrainian sources report that the Russian army is moving forces, including tanks and other armored vehicles, from the Crimean peninsula to the Zaporizhia region in preparation for a new offensive that is planned to begin in the near future.
Not to mention the Gauleiter of Zaporozhye region announcing a pause of an underground school construction near Orekhov and Gulyai-pole on the Zapo line due to threat of a new Russian offensive.
Two new NYT articles predict the next few months:
The first one claims the war will definitely end in 2025, no matter who was going to be elected president. This is because both sides are allegedly ‘running out of troops’. However, while no evidence is given for the Russian claim, the author reveals that intelligence agencies predict it is Ukraine that will “run out of soldiers soon”:
That’s bad news for Ukraine. Russian forces are advancing in the east. They’ve also reclaimed some of the Russian territory that Ukraine captured this past summer. Ukraine still has weapons, but its troops are spread thin. Intelligence agencies think it will run out of soldiers soon.
In fact, interestingly, Putin had just announced in a new speech that Russia still gets 1,000 daily military signups:
Belousov confirmed this by stating the total number for 2024 enlistments is 427,000. Divided into 12 months, this totals ~35,600 monthly enlistments:
▪️In 2024, Russian troops liberated almost 4.5 thousand square kilometers of territory occupied by the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
▪️An integrated information environment for decision-making at the tactical level will be created.
▪️Over 427 thousand people have entered service under contract since the beginning of 2024.
▪️Compared to 2022, the Russian military receives 7 times more tanks, 3 times more infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, and 23 times more drones.
▪️Large bases should be replaced by a layered network of warehouses.
▪️It is necessary to ensure the protection of arsenals and fuel bases within the range of the Ukrainian Armed Forces' weapons.
▪️A new branch of the armed forces should be formed in 2025- the Unmanned Systems Troops.
Note above he also mentioned a new initiative for Russia to decentralize its bases within range of NATO weaponry like ATACMS, converting everything into a vast network of forward-deployed warehouses and ammo dumps.
Here he states this effort has already begun, and in the future a total reconceptualization of how logistics and storage are distributed on the front will take place:
The next similarly titled article spins similar fairytales about Russian losses only to dampen the blow of their main thesis, which is that Ukraine has a severe soldier shortage and is on its way to losing the conflict:
The article essentially finds no solution, concluding that only the US as military guarantor of Ukraine’s terms would allow Ukraine to walk away with some semblance of security—but that they admit is not likely. Trump seeks to shift militarily to Asia, with Ukraine being left as Europe’s problem—a Europe too politically divided to stand any chance of guaranteeing or securing anything.
In short: the entire Western commentariat is out of ideas, resigned to repeating the same tired tropes about claimed Russian losses and high cabbage prices sure to ‘devastate’ the Russian economy any minute now.
The fact is, Russia is capturing more and more territory and Ukraine’s strikes on Russian territory are becoming increasingly ineffective. Last week another massive drone attack was launched at the Crimean Kerch Bridge, now memory-holed and hardly drawing even a passing headline because Russian defenses easily thwarted all hostile objects.
As an aside, the one interesting factor was Ukraine’s continued attempts to innovate and change up its attacks. This time the naval drones were armed with machine guns capable of targeting Russian response helicopters:
Ukraine’s attacks are simply falling short and not doing any long lasting damage anywhere because Russia is adapting too quickly to everything. Only the odd refinery still gets occasionally hit, filling the sky with headline-grabbing black plumes. But the oil storage tank fires are generally quickly put out and repaired without a second thought.
A Foreign Policy article again demonstrates that Ukraine has no agency when it comes to its masters:
The author argues for the US to negotiate with Russia on Ukraine’s behalf, lest Zelensky and co. prematurely set fire to the negotiations with unrealistic demands.
It further admits both sides have issues that are non-starters and the negotiations are unlikely to work anyway. For Russia, the stationing of foreign ‘peacekeeping troops’ is just as bad or worse than Ukraine joining NATO. And for Ukraine, the US forcing the AFU to abandon currently held territory in Zaporozhye, Kherson, etc., which Russia demands as part of its terms will be an impossible ask—something I myself have repeated many times.
It further points out that European countries would only station troops if the US guaranteed to back them up militarily should those troops be attacked by Russia—a scenario the author finds unlikely given Trump’s strong signals opposing such possibilities.
However, everything that I have heard from Russians tells me that this is just as unacceptable to Moscow as NATO membership itself and would therefore make agreement impossible. Moreover, European countries would agree to send their troops only if they had an ironclad guarantee from Washington that the United States would intervene if they were attacked. This, in effect, punts the decision back to Washington—not Kyiv, and not Brussels, Warsaw or Paris.
A new Reuters piece confirms that Poland has outright rejected Macron’s overtures to jointly station peacekeeping troops anyway:
As such, one can clearly see the ‘negotiations’ are a total nonstarter. Other global figures agree:
On the front, Russian forces continue to make gains, including in Zaporozhye where the larger claimed offensive is set to debut.
Russian units have re-occupied Novy Komar to the north, after Ukraine booted the first recon unit which established a foothold there a week or two ago:
Then in the south, Makarovka has been almost entirely encircled with Blagodatne captured. Ukrainian military-linked channels write with urgency about the deteriorating situation, with some claiming Velyka Novosilka may not last another two weeks.
Velyka Novoselka
Fighting continues near Rozdolne and in the area of Novy Komar.
For a while there was parity, but the enemy added operational reserves in that area and is again trying to actively storm.
The occupier again managed to partially restore its positions in Novy Komar.
The most dangerous situation now is in Velyka Novoselka itself, where the enemy is trying to regain lost positions and advance further.
Our soldiers are using extreme efforts to slow down the movement and also counterattack when possible.
Further south, the occupier is increasing its efforts and grouping to capture Makarivka, Storozhevo, and Vremivka.
From Blagodatne, the enemy crossed the Mokry Yaly River and wants to surround the Makariv garrison.
There are also attempts to advance along our right flank towards Novoselka.
The enemy is still at the peak of its offensive, so it is difficult to say whether the village of Velyka Novosilka, along with the bridgehead, will be held even for the next 2 weeks.
👉 Ukrainian Post
On the Kurakhove front the situation is even worse. The entire steppe southeast of Kurakhove collapsed, and now virtually the entire city itself has been captured, save for the industrial section to the west which holds the Kurakhove power plant:
Seen on the left side of the map, the Zelenovka push threatens to completely cut off Kurakhove’s last supply route. From Suriyak:
With the capture of Zelenivka, the Russian army would find itself three kilometers from the H-15 Zaporizhzhia - Donetsk highway, putting the forces deployed in the Kurakhove district and the city in grave danger. It is expected that the enveloping movement will develop in the following days from the south towards this road. In the meantime, Russian troops will continue to push Ukrainian troops westward from the Power plant and north of the reservoir.
Ukrainian officer channels write:
North of there, Russian forces continue expanding the main line towards Pokrovsk in anticipation of a full eventual assault on the fortress city:
Situation on Pokrovsk front: Russian Army made new advances west of Novotroits'ke, south of Dachenske & southwest of Pushkine. In addition, Russian forces made a series of advances west of Krasnyi Yar along the railway towards Myrnohrad.
And in Toresk Russian forces continue advancing street by street and now control the majority of the city:
Lastly, there are gains in Kursk as well, but it is far more slow going because Zelensky continues to pump this salient with the most reserves, not to mention best trained and most experienced troops. As such, Russia is suffering much larger losses in Kursk than many other areas, but it still likely pales in comparison to Ukraine’s losses—a glimpse of which can be seen here and here. In his earlier speech Belousov reported that Ukraine suffered 560,000 total casualties just in 2024 alone, with over 40,000 of them being in Kursk:
Keep in mind 560k including wounded would likely amount to only about 120-150k KIA, which could amount to as low as 12k dead per month. That could represent another 10-12k disabled. Given that Le Monde reported that by autumn Ukraine’s recruitment was around 20k per month, this means Ukraine is experiencing a net loss of troops, but not yet a catastrophic one:
On the optimistic side, it could be as low as 4-5k monthly net loss, which would take many months to reach depletion of hundreds of thousands.
Russia on the other hand is said to still recruit 30k monthly according to Putin. My best estimate at current Russian losses is 100-200 dead per day, which fluctuates—sometimes a little less, sometimes more. This would generate 4500-6000 monthly dead and probably 10-12k total monthly permanent losses (including disabled) which should in theory be easily covered by the mobilizations while retaining a net gain.
Some may ask, by the way, why North Korean troops are necessary in Kursk if Russia is doing ‘so well’ with troop replenishment. And it is a good question, but my personal take is that the potential North Korean contingents don’t have as much to do with troop replenishment as they do with Russia cementing and formalizing the strategic partnership agreements with North Korea as a show of force against NATO. It is Russia’s way of showcasing the deepening of ties as deterrent, as if to send a message: see, if you invade us, we will stand together and become your worst nightmare.
There’s evidence to back this up: Recall that a year ago, reports claimed various other nations virtually begged to send their troops to assist Russia. Syria and several African nations were amongst them, as well as Yemen, but Russia turned them all down. If it was that desperate for troops it would have made a far greater effort in recruiting from all these countries.
Secondly, the North Korean troops could have very well been sent at Kim’s request, not Russia’s. That’s because Kim—seeing the buildup of provocations and aggression against North Korea—was likely interested in getting real life combat experience for his own troops, so that they can return and seed it all back into the DPRK’s larger military structure. Given that a broader strategic deal was already in play between the two countries, Putin likely acquiesced, since it is something that had benefits for both sides. After all, if Russia was truly desperate for troops it could have called on its Union State partner Belarus.
Last item:
On Ukrainian TV, journalist Yuriy Butusov admits that the AFU is taking much larger losses than Russia on the Kurakhove front, given that the encirclement position is so unfavorable and causes retreating Ukrainian units to be struck from every side:
"Losses in this direction are critical. We cannot defend such disadvantageous positions given the enemy's superiority in numbers and ammunition," said Yuriy Butusov, editor-in-chief of censor dot net. According to him, the situation escalated about a month ago. The only supply route is under constant attack. Deepstate and military journalists warn of the risk of encirclement, but the Armed Forces of Ukraine denies information about the risk of encirclement of Ukrainian troops near Kurakhovo. The operational-strategic group of forces "Khortytsia" stated that Ukrainian units are holding the line.]
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The grind will continue. Eventually all the major cities east of Dnieper will be Russian with sieges forming up on those on the river. The river can be crossed at places of Russia's choosing. I still favor a blitz down Kerson way. As I wrote earlier this month, I see capitulation being the endgame, not negotiations as NATO is currently incapable of accepting what must be accepted--a new Eurasian security structure that nullifies NATO and sends it to the garbage pile.
In the greater conflict between Russia and the Outlaw US Empire, I see NATO's MIC having to spend 5X Russia's current 6.2% of GDP just to catch-up in both quality and numbers; yet, that gap continues to widen daily, and as Putin said Russia's not slowing down. Imagine what devoting 25% of GDP to the MIC would do to all NATO economies. Yes, the geopolitical game has yet to end, but its ending contours are visible. The Empire lacks the proxies and the military to defeat Russia, China or BRICS. That will be of little solace to Syrians or Palestinians. And the nations comprising the Arc of Instability and their people will likely experience the dying writhing of the Imperial Sanke. It won't happen tomorrow or next year, but as long as the nukes don't fly, the Outlaw US Empire has lost because it lacks the resources and industrial capacity to conquer the world.
I think as time passes it is quite clear that a few things are true - yes, Russia is massively defeating Ukraine BUT at unacceptable losses to Russia. Losing 100-200 men a day means losing 30-40k KIA of your best people a year, with 3x as many more wounded. By the time this war is over, 1% of Russia's population will have been either killed or maimed by war, which if you age and sex adjust will mean 5-10% of military aged men. Its a travesty.
Yes, Ukraine will be a non-state, 404 as they say on TG. But Russia needs to endure somehow, and it faces grave challenges. I don't understand why they haven't Oreshnik-ed Zelensky yet, I don't understand why they haven't used it again, and I don't understand why they let EU/NATO/US get away with murder (literally). From where I'm sitting Russia is winning tactically but losing strategically. It doesn't help that her opponents (Germany, England, Finland, Baltics, Ukraine, etc) are maniacally enthusiastic about committing economic suicide but economies can be rebuilt, men stay dead.