The next media narrative is slowly taking shape that Russia is starting to get “exhausted”, which will—naturally—culminate in some kind of breakdown in 2026. This is of course an old narrative repurposed anew now that Ukraine itself is in its least enviable shape ever, with no prospects at all of improvement.
Interestingly, for up to two years now, we have heard from top figures and publications that 2026 would be the “key year” beyond which Russia would no longer be able to sustain itself, and this from several different perspectives. Economically, Russia’s so-called ‘headwinds’ would finally prevail, and its “overheating” economy would begin to see widespread ‘structural breakdowns’ or outright collapse.
Militarily, Russia would have run out of all armor by 2026 and would no longer be able to carry out “maneuver attacks”, while troop recruitment capacity would dwindle, requiring Putin to finally launch that large-scale ‘mobilization’ he’s been putting off for so long, resulting in mass social upheavals and even a coup.
Given that we’re at the end of 2025, it is a fitting time to look ahead at some of these projections, and see where things truly stand for both sides leading into 2026.
Also, of particular significance is the fact that the Ukrainian conflict is approaching a key milestone: on January 11th, 2026 the conflict will have lasted precisely 1,418 days from its onset in February 22, 2022. 1,418 is the exact length of time that the Eastern Front war between Germany and the USSR lasted, from June 22, 1941 to May 8, 1945. And so, to some extents it is only natural that some begin to question the prospects of Russia’s longevity in this conflict.
Many new MSM publications are starting to use the word ‘exhaustion’, the latest being the Sunday Times:
They utilize the now-standard practice of couching Ukraine’s own near-terminal exhaustion in false or exaggerated descriptions of Russia’s selfsame condition. This has been the chief tactic of the West in ever admitting any of Ukraine’s faults or weaknesses: when doing so, always make sure that Russia is accused of suffering from the same or worse, in order to ‘soften the blow’ and not demoralize the Western audience too much; after all, this audience is the one coughing up its hard-earned tax dollars to keep funding the West’s proxy and war machine in one.
Conscription increasingly looks like press ganging. Ukraine’s notorious practice of “busification”, whereby recruiters forcibly round up men of conscription age and bus them to draft offices, has not only led many to flee the country, it is causing a labour shortage in the civilian economy. Desertion is rife, with more than 160,000 open criminal cases, even though in some cases this is simply a way for soldiers to transfer from one unit to the next.
The article above for instance goes down the laundry list of ways Ukrainians are losing optimism and hope for any positive outcome in the war, but then couches it all by claiming that Russia’s economy is losing steam and will “stagnate” in 2026.
One spectacular point of hypocrisy from Western publications can be highlighted here. The article notes that Russia’s economy is only growing on the basis of defense production needs:
GDP officially still grew 1 per cent this year, but that is largely on the basis of war production: building equipment shortly to be destroyed. Although Putin continues to try to talk it up, the underlying economy is already in recession and is likely to stagnate in 2026.
This is obviously characterized as a major weakness. Yet by the same token, the latest Financial Times report proudly declares that all of Europe’s economies depend entirely on German defense spending:
From the opening sentence:
Europe’s hopes of a return to growth in 2026 rest largely on Germany’s €1tn debt-funded spending drive on infrastructure and defence, according to a Financial Times survey.
Yet the 88 economists polled are split over whether Berlin’s fiscal push will deliver a “European renaissance” or fade amid entrenched structural weaknesses and geopolitical uncertainty.
So, Russia’s war-driven economy means Russia is collapsing, but Europe’s war-driven economy heralds a forthcoming renaissance of European economic might….right.
That’s not to even mention the pathetic fact that all of Europe is looking for Germany alone to rescue it, and this all still is somehow meant to compare favorably in optics to singular Russia.
The Times article lazily concludes—without a single real data point of even remotely convincing proof—that this all means Russia will become ‘exhausted’ in 2026, leading to an entirely frozen conflict, of course ignoring the fact that Russia’s advances are literally accelerating to unseen heights:
Even if war continues throughout 2026, though, it will be increasingly hard to sustain at the current level. The choices everyone is going to have to make are getting more painful — for Putin (whether to mobilise reservists) or Zelensky (whether to lower the conscription age).
Even without a deal, the war may decline in tempo and intensity, at least on the ground. As exhaustion sets in, both sides may be willing to accept compromises currently regarded as impossible.
For instance: where do they get that Putin will have to “mobilize reservists”?
Even Ukraine’s Budanov just yesterday again reiterated that Russia is having no issues mobilizing ~410,000 men per year, and will do so again in 2026—this all while many Russian regions are now dropping their recruitment bonuses due to over-subscription. Recall that I’ve previously shared the rumor that 400k+ appears to be the max yearly amount Russia can even handle, with many recruitment offices reportedly turning people away because the training range capacity simply does not exist to train more troops per month than what is already coming in. The closer Russia gets to visibly winning, I suspect, the more recruitment will surge and things could acutely speed up.
There are contrasting takes, however. Azov’s Biletsky just stated that Russia is in fact—for the first time ever—not making up for its losses via recruitment:
Colonel Andriy Biletsky Founder Of Azov Battalion:
"For the first time in a long period, in recent months, according to all intelligence data, including from Western allies, the reinforcement of personnel in the Russian Armed Forces does not outweigh the losses,"
Note his transition to the on-message characterizations of Russian ‘exhaustion’, again couching Ukraine’s own exhaustion with comparisons to Russia suffering “the same” condition:
“We and the Russians are like boxers in the 12th round. We think about our condition and exhaustion, like, "I'm going to collapse now, and that's it." But I think the Russians are more or less in the same condition.”
“The Russians have a catastrophic situation in all major types of weapons, armored vehicles, artillery systems, etc.”
“The Russians are currently much more successful in air strikes against Ukraine than on the front lines.”
“Yes, [Ukraine] has had setbacks, there have been retreats, of course. But how reasonable is the price for this for the Russians?”
“They're running out of steam. The quality of personnel has long been extremely poor, but combat training is also objectively deteriorating further with each passing month”
- Colonel Andriy Biletsky
Recall that this is the only blog where you get an impartial view from both sides, not one-sided partisan propaganda. So we must examine the words and statistics from both ends to properly tune the analysis.
His statement about Russia “running out of steam” on the front is particularly suspect. Just today, the full and total captures of both Gulyaipole and Mirnograd were finally announced. At the same time, new transmissions from Kupyansk suggest that the situation may be improving for Russians there. Ukraine has typically lost one major city per year in prior years: Mariupol in 2022, Bakhmut in 2023, Avdeevka in 2024—though some count Severodonetsk and Lisichansk for 2022 as well.
Now in 2025, Ukraine has lost Pokrovsk, Mirnograd, Seversk, Gulyaipole, and a host of smaller ones such as Velyka Novosilka and Volchansk in the north. A string of cities remain perched to be captured, such as Konstantinovka, Kupyansk, Stepnogorsk, Novopavlovka, and the one likely to go next, given the renewed Russian advances there as of the past two days: Krasny Lyman.
This, contrary to Biletsky’s words, does not indicate a “slow down” of any sort on the front. Even Roepcke is shocked at the recent speed.
By the way, there are two other major problems with Biletsky’s statements. First, he says the following simply absurd line:
The enemy's objective losses are at least 6, sometimes 8 times greater than our losses. We don't have such a large difference in manpower to sustain losses 6-8 times greater and be able to conduct such a campaign for a long time.
Claiming that Russia suffers an unfavorable 8:1 loss ratio to Ukraine simply discredits the remainder of his argument.
What discredits it even more, however, is the fact that a cursory search of his previous statements can find gems like this one from early 2025:
Russia's Army Is Falling Apart: Their 2024 Offensive Capacity Was Wiped Out
In a recent interview with Yanina Sokolova, Andriy Biletsky, founder of the "Azov" Regiment and commander of Ukraine’s 3rd Assault Brigade, stated that Russia has completely burned through its offensive potential from 2024 — and hasn't built a new one.
❝The Russian army today is significantly weaker than it was last year,❞ Biletsky emphasized.
This statement is from June of 2025, long before Russia was poised to capture all the current territories, or truly began its ‘summer offensive’ in full on the Zaporozhye-Dnipro region. Thus, we can see that his previous assessments have already proven flat, which hangs a cloud over his present statements.
Other publications are taking a slightly different approach. Politico likewise invokes the spirit of ‘exhaustion’, but at least accurately identifies the threat that it is Europe and the West being “exhausted”—or in their words, bled dry—by Russia, rather than the other way around:
