Russian Officials Walk-Back Threats of 'Systematic' Devastation of Kiev 'Decision-Making Centers'?

The Kremlin appears to have somewhat walked back its threats of systematic strikes on Kiev via a series of ‘clarifications’ issued by Peskov and Chairman of the State Duma Defense Committee Andrey Kartapolov.

Kartapolov sent reverberations of eye-rolls and disgust through Russian channels after he announced that the Verkhovna Rada and President’s Office on Bankova are not infact “decision-making” centers and Russia will not be striking them. You can judge for yourself if his logic is sound or not:

“The Verkhovna Rada is not a decision-making center — just like in Russia, for example, the State Duma is not one. Deputies do not control the troops and do not determine where and when to strike.

The same can be said about the office of the Ukrainian president. We all understand that Zelenksy doesn’t stay there. He sits in a bunker, and in his office there are two security guards and five cleaners. Is it worth spending expensive ammunition on, in fact, an empty place?

Therefore, in this case, the decision-making centers are meant to be the deepened and protected command posts of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, their branches, units, possibly other power structures, including government structures. But we need to understand that they are not in the center of Kiev. These are hidden, well-fortified points. And our task is to identify them and expose them with the help of the available weapons,” said Kartapolov.

The problem his explanation brings up is as follows: If these recognizable governmental institutions are not decision-making centers, and the true centers are underground military bunkers and protected command posts, then why hasn’t Russia already hit those decision-making centers, given that they are purely military targets?

It would be understandable if Russia held back in not hitting political offices on Bankova, but the “protected command posts” should have long been targets—so this reasoning appears strange.

There are, perhaps, some explanations: maybe the bunkers he’s referring to are below other civilian buildings or objects which Russia had avoided hitting, like for instance how Trump is building a kind of “military command center” beneath the new White House ballroom. But it still raises questions—though, luckily many have noted that Kartapolov does not appear to be speaking from an official capacity, since such decisions are not actually made in the Russian Duma.

Peskov, though, did join in the discourse with a very drily pedantic and bureaucratically abstruse response—that “systematicity” does not equate to “periodicity”. This is a real equivocating way of saying that Russia’s promise to engage in a new ‘systematic’ method of strikes on Kiev did not imply it will be constant or daily—well, what does it equate to then, precisely?

Not every Russian figure appeared to walk-back the provocative language. Leonid Slutsky, leader of the Russian LDPR party—who also happens to be the head of a powerful Duma subcommittee—suggested Russia should take out not only Kiev but all the Dnepr bridges:

https://ldpr.ru/event/slutskiy-predlozhil-udarit-po-mostam-cherez-dnepr-i-aeroportu-borispol-posle-ataki-vsu-na-starobelsk/

The parliamentarian also proposed striking the railway bridges over the Dnieper River and the runway at Boryspil Airport to disrupt the supply of Western weapons.

What can we say?

The Kremlin clearly believes that things are not as “urgent” for Russia as the current narratives desperately try to make it seem, and is happy to continue plodding out the grinding campaign against Ukraine. As always, this likely has to do with meticulous military and military-intelligence-related projections that give the Kremlin confidence that Ukraine will not be able to outlast Russia even at the current attritional pace.

As such, loud pleas for various types of mass retribution, wide-scale mobilizations, etc., do not seem to faze the Kremlin’s rigidly methodical and opaque policy makers, and it could very well be for good reason.

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Apart from that, there continues to be noise from the West about an alleged Russian invasion on Europe, just as Zelensky amplifies claims that Russia seeks to attack from Belarus.

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/russia-ukraine-war-europe-baltics-bb9d8d94

It seems much more evident that it is Ukraine and the West attempting to force Russia to attack the Baltics in self-defense, while pinning the blame on Putin’s broader “goals”. It’s Zelensky that desperately needs the war to go “wider” in order to tie Russia’s hands—time favors Russia, not Ukraine. Each month that passes, it is Ukraine that inches closer to economic, military, and political collapse, while Russia merely faces modest “strains”.

The other new narrative making the rounds is that Ukraine has been attacking the Russian R-280 (also known as M14) highway which goes from Taganrog to Crimea with long range drones. The pro-UA side has been exaggerating claims of the “total fire control” of this route, with Russian logistics set to become completely untenable and Crimea to be effectively cut-off in the near future—a claim that has been made just about every year since 2022.

That said, this time with improvements in Ukrainian medium-range drone technology, they have apparently succeeded in torching a sizable amount of ‘rear’ Russian logistics trucks along this route.

Russian analyst Andrei Medvedev writes on his channel that this will become the main Ukrainian thrust over the next few months:

And based on the current actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, it’s already quite clear what their main focus will be in the summer campaign. For reasonable people, this is obvious. The main tasks of the Armed Forces of Ukraine will be carried out with the help of drones. The main directions of action are likely to be the following.

First. The Ukrainians will try to isolate Crimea. Literally. Using BEKs (unmanned naval drones) to completely stop any shipping in the region, including civilian small vessels. From the air, they will try to take control of the peninsula by striking at highways, civilian objects, and, above all, civilian vehicles. I’m convinced that the emphasis will be on air terror against the civilian population.

Second. It’s quite obvious that the enemy’s plans include new attacks on the Crimean Bridge. Combined attacks: from the air and from the water. The attacks that have already taken place, including attempts by BEKs, are clearly preparatory, probing our weak points.

Third. With the help of drones, the Armed Forces of Ukraine will try to take under fire control the R-280 highway in Novorossiya and the main roads of Donbass. First, they will eliminate cargo transportation. Gas stations too. Then they will proceed to their usual practice of terror against civilians. They will burn ordinary cars. From the point of view of a normal person, this makes no sense, but if you look through the eyes of a Ukrainian terrorist, everything falls into place. This is an attempt to sow chaos and horror. Today in Ukraine, it’s precisely the drone pilots who are the most motivated killers.

The Armed Forces of Ukraine will try to take control of other federal highways in southern Russia. To date, the system of drone repeaters, which simultaneously serve as “mothers” for smaller devices, allows them to operate at distances of more than 100 kilometers from the operator. What’s happening in Crimea is a direct confirmation of this. And given the management through Starlink terminals, the enemy’s task is greatly simplified.

The problem is not that we don’t have means of destruction. Or that we don’t have officers capable of creatively and rigorously approaching the tasks of fire destruction. The problem is the lack of clear systemic solutions and a disorganized approach to combating enemy drones. Plus the traditional underestimation of the enemy.

Whether someone likes it or not, I’ll say it. Today in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, when appointing officers to command positions, more and more often, what matters is not seniority, but real efficiency. Not having an education in a military academy, but actual results. The same Madyar can remove commanders of regiments and brigades for inefficient use of drone operators. The Third Assault Brigade (the same “Azov”) can take any competent soldier or officer from other units. The traditional post-Soviet military bureaucracy has been greatly curtailed there.

The question is not that we don’t know how or that we don’t have capable officers. We have them. The question is the sluggishness in decision-making and in organizing systematic work.
If there are decisions - there will be results.

PS How to solve the Starlink problem? I think we need to somehow please Elon Musk. After all, we haven’t pleased the American white baron much lately. And that’s why there’s no result.

The only thing I’ll take issue with above is the idea of hitting the Crimean bridge with naval drones. I’m not sure if Medvedev has seen the Russian defenses there these days, but they have effectively covered all pylons and bridge pillars with huge amounts of obstacles essentially making it impossible for any drone to come near them.

And while the Ukrainian side likes to cheer on the recent modest successes on the Russian logistics line there, they completely ignore the parallel attacks Russia has begun on Ukraine’s own rear, which goes from Kiev to the Polish resupply corridor in the far west of the country:

Ukrainian transport companies' pages report that Russian drones are attacking cargo trucks on the Kyiv-Chop highway.

This is the main logistical route to western Ukraine. It is used to transport weapons and aid from the Polish airfield in Rzeszów and from Germany.

Cargo trains carrying similar military supplies also travel on this route.

Even the ISW got in on the warnings with their latest issue:

Russia may be preparing attacks from Belarus on key logistics routes from the West to Ukraine, — ISW

▪️In particular, American analysts warn about the threat of drone attacks on key logistics routes, including the railway to Poland and the Kyiv-Chop highway, which is one of the important routes for supplying Western aid from Poland to Ukraine.
▪️According to ISW, this may be related to Ukrainian activity in Belarusian airspace, which will allow expanding the zone of destruction of Ukrainian transport and logistics hubs in the north and west of the country.
▪️ISW suggests that recent statements from Minsk about alleged "Ukrainian drones" over Belarus may be an attempt to prepare the ground for these attacks.

It appears both sides are playing the chicken-or-the-egg game apropos the escalations: ISW claims Russia will use Ukraine’s airspace violations of other countries including Belarus as casus belli for itself to begin using Belarusian airspace against Ukraine. Meanwhile, Ukraine claims Russia is making these violations up in order to commandeer Belarus’s airspace.

In reality, Belarus itself released a report of 116 Ukrainian drone violations across the Belarusian border just in the past week alone:

https://www.sb.by/articles/za-poslednyuyu-nedelyu-zafiksirovano-116-popytok-narushit-belorusskuyu-granitsu-ukrainskimi-bpla-vol.html

At the Ukrainian border training grounds, the use of strike UAVs, as well as the storming and capture of buildings, is being practiced. Against this backdrop, our air defense systems regularly detect Ukrainian combat UAVs crossing the Belarusian border and crashing on our territory.

In some cases, these are not random attacks, but attempts to target elements of the border infrastructure under the guise of accidental incursions. In the past week alone, there have been 116 such incidents, and the air defense forces have been deployed 59 times. As for the illegal crossing of the border by Ukrainians fleeing forced mobilization, this is also a problem. Over the past month, 76 such violators have been detained. Some of them are spies with specific tasks, said Alexander Volfovich (State Secretary of the Security Council of Belarus)

Leading Ukrainian drone and EW figure Sergei ‘Flash’ Beskrestnov had even just enlarged on this very topic several days ago, claiming that Russia is already using Belarusian radio towers to guide Geran drones along the Belarusian border toward the western regions of Ukraine:

At the end of winter, we stopped the operation of the 'Shahid' control points from the territory of the Republic of Belarus. Since then, we have not recorded any active attempts to resume the operation of these points.

During a combined attack on May 13, we again detected the operation of radio modems on board Russian drones over our territory near the borders of Belarus.

The distance to the Russian borders from the drones is about 500 kilometers. Therefore, a direct control channel is impossible. The distance to the nearest Shahid with a modem also excludes the possibility of radio communication via a chain.

I suspect the resumption of the operation of the Shahid radio control point from the territory of Belarus, but this time at a great depth from the center of the country.

So far, these are isolated cases. The Ukrainian defense forces are keeping this issue under control. We never take any measures without 100% certainty.

This is the very corridor Russia is said to have been attacking Ukrainian logistics on of late.

On a related note, ‘Flash’ also remarked about new Russian Lancets which fly in total radio silence so that Ukrainian RF detectors and spectrum analyzers can’t pick them up until the last moment:

Attention. On various fronts, we have observed that the 'Lancets' operate in full radio silence mode until the moment of attack.

The enemy does this intentionally so that we cannot identify the type of UAV, recognize the threat, and respond to it.

It's not yet clear which type of navigation the 'Lancet' uses in this case. An inertial system, beacons, or terrain recognition based on images.

For those that don’t know, all drones release radio frequency signals (RF) back toward their controlling unit, and the top Ukrainian experts like ‘Flash’ have managed to identify the unique RF ‘fingerprint’ of virtually every Russian drone, making it possible to know exactly what type of drone is operating on any given front just based on the frequency profile picked up by over-the-counter analyzers that are pointed at the skies from Ukrainian trenches.

According to him, Lancets appear to now be flying without emitting frequencies at all, which means they are likely roaming in AI mode and finding targets on their own.

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Lastly, on the topic of drones and AI swarms, according to reports Russia is preparing to start preliminary testing of a new Kub drone-swarm batch launcher vehicle:

-The mobile reconnaissance-strike system Kub-SM, designed to be used in swarm attacks, is ready for preliminary testing, Kalashnikov Group CEO Alan Lushnikov told reporters on May 22.

“The system is fully ready for preliminary testing, so we are confident that we will get some results very soon,” he said.

Kalashnikov Group first presented the new Kub-SM system at the international arms exhibition and conference IDEX-2025 in the United Arab Emirates last year.

The system, shown in official renders mounted on a 6×6 armored truck, can carry up to 16 transport-launch containers. It deploys a mixed swarm: 14 flying munitions, each armed with a five-kilogram warhead, and two reconnaissance drones that act as data relays with parachutes for recovery.

The flying munitions and reconnaissance drones are launched from the truck using gas-dynamic charges for rapid consecutive firing.

The system’s range is reportedly up to 45 kilometers, with munitions launched and reconnaissance drones capable of flying at an altitude of 2.5 kilometers at speeds up to 100 kilometers per hour.

The Kub-SM system is designed to attack unarmored and lightly armored vehicles, division, battalion, and battery command posts, and personnel wearing armor.

It can also be used to attack air defense and missile defense locations, electronic reconnaissance and electronic warfare systems such as air traffic control radars, counter-battery operation radars, and ground reconnaissance radars.

Additionally, it can target rear support facilities, such as drone launch sites, and aircraft or helicopters located outside shelters at airfields.

Kub-SM will provide the Russian military with a highly maneuverable comprehensive reconnaissance and strike swarm solution.

The latest statements from Kalashnikov’s CEO indicate that the system will begin testing this year and could soon enter service.

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