Putin's Cabinet Shakeup Stumps Western Intelligentsia

As many had been suspecting for days, Putin initiated a major shakeup in his cabinet. The most notable was the removal of longtime defense minister Shoigu, to be replaced with a man many have not heard of: Andrey Belousov, an economist by trade and training.

Some considered this to be a deliberate misdirection by Putin, whom many expected to replace Shoigu with rising star Dyumin.

There are plenty of angles from which to cover this, but let’s take a few of the most important.

Firstly, was this a demotion or promotion for Shoigu? RYBAR, for one, calls it a promotion, given that his new position as Secretary of the Security Council is a quite prestigious one that silovik Patrushev—one of the Kremlin’s most powerful men—has held himself for nearly two decades:

Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu has been promoted - to the Security Council of the Russian Federation. It is not yet known where exactly Nikolai Patrushev will go. Perhaps, just as for Medvedev in his time, an additional position and a separate area that he will deal with will be invented for him. Or perhaps, Nikolai Platonovich has simply received a long-awaited retirement. What Shoigu's arrival will mean for the Security Council - an update and reshuffling (loyal Shoigu cadres will need to be brought in). At this stage, a certain almost caste system has developed in the structure of the Security Council, without the possibility of upward growth for individual employees. Perhaps, in the current conditions, this will mean a restructuring of the Security Council's work mechanism into a slightly different plane. Perhaps.

Others naturally believe this was a long-running coup against Shoigu and “his cadre”. Timur Ivanov’s recent arrest has been in the works for 5 years, as Russian prosecutors told us. They could have arrested him at any time, but chose to do so very symbolically not only before Putin’s re-election, but even literally on the same day he sat next to Shoigu on the defense council. While I don’t necessarily buy into any conspiracy theories prima facie, I do note that there is no such thing as coincidences in the great game of power politics.

For Timur Ivanov to have been linked as a close ally of Shoigu—who was the one that appointed him—was significant. There were even rumors that the ‘embezzling’ charge was a cover for much more serious espionage. Some even go as far as to hypothesize that the entire operation is one grand, long-running take down of the Shoigu clan, as this analyst writes:

Timur Ivanov is one of the people Prigozhin wanted Putin to get rid of. One of the resources close to the ''Wagner'' group just posted this:

''On behalf of PMC "Wagner" we would like to express our deep gratitude to the Chairman Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation to Alexander Ivanovich Bastrykin for the arrest of a state-level corrupt official, Deputy Minister of Defense Russian Federation Timur Ivanov. Thanks to the department you lead, the leakage of huge material resources from the state treasury, which are so necessary now to maintain the economic stability of the country at a time when there is enormous pressure from countries unfriendly to us, has been stopped. Over the many years of his corrupt activities, this official has caused colossal damage not only to our army, but also to the ordinary Russian people. We believe in the justice of the law and hope that this and other corrupt scoundrels will receive a well-deserved severe punishment to the fullest extent of the Criminal Law of the Russian Federation.''

Another theory along the conspiracy slant:

"Perhaps this is not a final arrangement. While the battle at the top continues. This is the first stage of the victory of the Kovalchuk clan. A brilliant operation was carried out to eliminate Shoigu. Obviously, he will fly further down. People from his entourage will be grabbed. He no longer has real power.

Shoigu represented the largest clan. Next in line, logically, are smaller fish, like the Rotenbergs. They either have to bend under the Kovalchuks or they will be devoured. And for one thing, people from their circle, such as Kolokoltsev. I think he won’t stay put for long and there will be changes at the Ministry of Internal Affairs for six months. With the FSB, I also think there may be a replacement within six months, this is also connected with the stages of internal struggle.”

Lastly, and most plausibly: “Tsargrad political commentator Andrey Perla is sure that by putting Belousov at the head of the Defense Ministry, Vladimir Putin wants to solve two tasks”:

The first is to nip in the bud all the arguments about the very possibility of corruption in the defense department.

The second is to divide the leadership of troops during combat operations and the organizational and economic support of the army and navy.

Perla wondered how much the agency would change Belousov, because, presumably, now a significant part of the staff is Shoigu's people.

Machinations take a very long time to develop and play out at the elite level. Prigozhin himself gravely disrespected Russia and did not “pay” for it until many months later. Therefore it is possible that Putin, not wanting to rock the boat for understandable reasons, preferred to wait until such time that a shakeup would be natural and expected, which opportunity the post-election customary cabinet reshuffle presented; to get difficult things done gradually without making too many waves is an artful science.

But whatever the true reasons, one thing I personally do believe is that Russia—like many world countries—suffers from a creeping illness of gerontocracy, as the Soviet Union itself once did in its terminal stage. It’s likely not as bad as the U.S., but there are many old figures, Sovoks and the like, which should have been put out to pasture and retired long ago. Not necessarily due to any corruption, per se, but simply due to the lack of passion and vitality in improving the country.

I for one do subscribe to the importance of physiognomy, and one look at many of the eldest carryovers and perennial officials shows an at times aging, depleted-looking, uninspired lot. Shoigu is not that old himself, but lately has admittedly been looking the worse-for-wear, haggard and worn out. Belousov, at a spiffy 65, is virtually a spring chicken by global gerontocratic standards.

Looks and physiognomy can certainly be deceiving, but at first glance he looks sharp, apt, and clear-eyed. A demonstrative video making the rounds is meant to showcase his keen understanding and direct forthrightness in regard to Russian drone production and its inherent limitations:

Furthermore, it’s said he’s a severe technologist and drone tech enthusiast who will focus the Russian defense production on the needed directions. In the recent round table session with frontline commanders, you’ll recall that Putin specifically conveyed Russia’s intentions to concentrate on UGV ground bot development.

It’s no coincidence that the ‘drone guy’ is then suddenly hired for the job. Look for this appointment to be very bullish for Russian drone advancement.

Peskov further elaborated on the appointment with an extremely significant clarification:

Read the bolded portion of the summary below:

🇷🇺 Dmitry Peskov’s full commentary on the reasons for the appointment of Andrei Belousov as Minister of Defense

❗️The budget of the Ministry of Defense and the security bloc was recently still around 3%, but recently it has grown to 6.7%. This is not a critical figure yet, but due to well-known geopolitical circumstances, we are gradually approaching the situation in the mid-80s, when the share of expenses for the security bloc in the economy was at the level of 7.4%.

❗️ It is very important to integrate the economy of the power bloc into the country’s economy. Write it down to fit the current moment. Today, the winner on the battlefield is the one who is open to innovation, more open to the most rapid implementation. Therefore, it is natural that at the current stage the president has decided that the Ministry of Defense should be headed by a civilian.

❗️ And this is not just a civilian, but a person who very successfully headed the Ministry of Economic Development, who for a long time was the assistant to the president on economic issues. And in the previous cabinet of ministers he was First Deputy Prime Minister.

❗️ The Ministry of Defense must be absolutely open to innovation, to introduce all advanced ideas.🇷🇺

As you can see, the appointment of Belousov is meant to streamline the economic integration of the defense industries and country’s general economy. An entire essay can be written on just what this one item alone means, precisely. Some have even interpreted it to mean some type of neo-liberal coup, as Belousov is said, by some, to be a “liberal” who was once assistant to German Gref of Sber bank, and will therefore “plunder” Russia’s economy by yoking the recently state-seized defense concerns back into the ‘private sector’—in essence, handing the keys to Russia’s future back to fat-cat weapons oligarchs.

We’ll have to wait and see, but I don’t think that’s what it means. This development can only be received positively as it shows Putin’s seriousness in tackling the issues of defense-economic integration and alleviation. I believe this will revolve around scaling of manufacturing processes and creating a more agile, flexible, and innovative defense sector by allowing private companies to integrate better with the developments currently being made by the ‘state owned’ industrial powerhouses. This is how it works in the U.S., and there are major advantages to fast developmental pipelines for new innovative designs.

While Russia has done very well in some sectors since the start of the SMO, in several others it has lagged very badly. For instance, the scaling and commercialization of personnel-based EW systems leaves much to be desired. Most of the systems on the ground are cheap Chinese knockoffs and requisitioned ad hoc, a process that is extremely stale and ineffective, causing the mass deaths of Russian servicemen to enemy drones. Something in this pipeline is in grave need of streamlining, which includes the “localization” that Belousov himself emphasized in the video above.

As for the concerns that he’s a civilian through and through, this has now become a du jour tradition under Putin and in fact the last four ministers of defense have all been non military. Shoigu, as most know, was an emergencies minister; before him, Serdyukov was a tax guy, brought in by Putin specifically to be an “outsider” who can clear out the cobwebs of the military apparatus incapable of self-policing; and even before him was Sergei Ivanov, an FSB chief who specialized in law, with no military background. After all, Peskov mentioned that once again Belousov was brought in by virtue—rather than in spite—of his non-military background.

Some final thoughts on the appointment from another analyst:

Belousov's appointment promises a total audit of all financial flows of the Ministry of Defense. He is a fairly tough and effective manager known for his practical approach to business. He often had an unpopular point of view on the work of accountable structures, which is probably what the Ministry of Defense needs now.

And there’s always this, for the believers:

The new Russian minister of defense, Andrey Belousov, is a practicing Orthodox Christian. He has personally donated to & built a monastery in the Vladimir Oblast: “Russia must become the guardian of the traditions of Christian civilisation. The era of globalism is over.”

Acquaintances of Andrei Belousov told The Bell (foreign agent) that he periodically serves as an altar boy in one of the churches, presumably in the Vladimir region.

In general, I view it cautiously as a very positive development. I have been outspoken in the past about the fact that much of Russia’s military structure at the onset of the SMO was a rusty, sometimes decrepit and even corrupt, carryover from the past. Years of low intensity operation or no hostilities generally results in the buildup of laziness, useless generals who stuff their pockets or sit on positions they view as sinecures rather than meritoriously earning their keep.

All this gets cleaned out by virtue of necessity—and an existential conflict brings necessity like no other. Since the beginning, Putin has been slowly clearing out the calcified structures, upwardly promoting and mobilizing deserving men to replace the hangers-on from the dusty ages of long time past. This is a continual and unending process, but it has bore fruit and today we see its ongoing progression. The spring renewal of change and adaptation is a good thing.

As a last quick mention of the ongoing Kharkov offensive, we’ve now seen the official introduction of the northern group’s operative tactical symbol:

A comparison of current operation to the 2022 attempt of taking over Kharkhov region

2022: Russian troops advanced primarily along roads and had reached the borders of Kharkhov city in a few days. Main troops entered

2024: Russian troops are avoiding stretching lines and are moving through forests and fields in the border, still a DRG led operation

2022: The symbols V, O, Z (which coincidentally are Initials of Volodymyr Oleksandrovych Zelenskyy) started appearing a few days before the main attack started

2024: The new tactical symbol was only unveiled after the attack had started

2022: Russians due to advancing too quickly also became prey to ambushes, suffering losses higher than Ukrainians who were hiding

2024: Russians have deployed more drones and means to destroy incoming Ukrainian reinforcements, the losses can be equal or even higher for Ukrainians for now

At the same time, with weapons like FPV drones, and FABs, the fighting style is also different

While not as grand as 2022 attempt in terms of land grab, this is more sustainable for the RU army, and creates strategic dilemmas for Ukrainian command

In addition to the above, it’s now said that Russia is demining entire fields by setting them on fire and burning all the mines off:

And things continue moving apace, with Russian forces seizing more villages and now having entered the actual city of Volchansk, the largest stronghold of the northern region:

Many Ukrainian military-linked channels are in panic or disorder, now openly accusing Ukrainian leadership of not having built any defenses in the north. It’s clear that what began as a coping attempt to downplay the northern advance is now turning into an open debacle:

Ukrainian volunteers complain that the Nazi formations of the GUR ("Kraken", "Sonechko", "Brotherhood", etc.)* blocked the evacuation of the local population from Volchansk and are using city residents as human shields

Local residents made an agreement with the volunteers, but did not let anyone in or let anyone out of the city.

Judging by the news reports, fighting for the city has already begun. Take care of yourself, dear ones! — calls for Dill Fresh

The AFU is now scrambling to plug the holes by routing its most elite units to the north, with GUR spetsnaz and Kraken reportedly coming to the rescue. Unfortunately for them, several Kraken groups have already been captured by Russian forces. Their interviews below:

Captured militant of the "Brotherhood" battalion of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Kyiv regime. This formation was created by the bastard Korczynski, who went to kill Russians back in Chechnya, as a member of UNA-UNSO he fought on the side of Duday's terrorists.

2nd Video:

A militant of the battalion ‘Brotherhood’, which is part of the GUR. One of these organisations similar to the RDK (the guy is from Krasnodar).

Starshe Edda fills in some details:

The second day after the start of the offensive of the North group of troops. The number of captured AFU has already exceeded 50, there is even one prisoner from the Kraken. It’s too early to estimate the enemy’s losses; there are probably 100 people lying on the strongholds, these are those whom the fleeing Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers could not drag away. How many of the enemy were destroyed as a result of incessant artillery and air strikes is unclear at the moment, but it is obvious that there is a lot.

Strelechye, Gatishchi, Pylnaya, Borisovka, Pletenevka, Krasnoye, Ogurtsovo, as well as the adjacent forest regiments and enemy fortifications, are under our control; battles are taking place in the Glubokoe area, as well as on the outskirts of Volchansk. It is very important to note that our losses are minimal, Storm of the North acts very competently, Lancets, FPV crews, artillerymen, tankers pave the way for them, sweeping away the enemy’s fortifications and his armored vehicles.

AFU cannot show their ohlos anything (meaning show successes on the battlefield), so they record videos with representatives of the cock volunteer corps, in which they talk about our great losses. I hope that the fighters of the cock corps will stop pissing on the fences in Kharkov and will already come to the aid of the Ukrainians, where we will drive them away. The enemy takes out all his failures on the civilians of Belgorod, shelling residential areas. It is this problem that the steel Northerners are now solving, unwinding the enemy.

He makes an important note I’ve seen underscored by others: for once, this offensive has been marked by a specific emphasis on the fact that Russian forces are utilizing effective combined arms tactics, with several frontline reports making pains to note that artillery and drone utilization is good, communications are notably coordinated and running fluidly, etc. This is contrary to many other fronts like Kherson where complaints about coordination between those mentioned aspects abound. It seems whoever is running the ‘Northern Wind’, as some are calling it, is doing a very competent job thus far.

And of course, the credit should also go to the units themselves, for which the picture is becoming gradually clearer. I mentioned some of the units suspected to be involved last time, but now there are a few more notables being put forth:

The 138th Separate Guards Motor Rifle Brigade, which is from the 6th Combined Arms Army from the Leningrad District; one source claims the 80th Tank Regiment, though I haven’t seen confirmation of this.

Then there’s reportedly the 18th Guards Motor Rifle Division, as part of the 11th Army Corps from the Baltic Fleet troops I already mentioned last time, with the 79th Motor Rifle Regiment operating as part of the 18th division.

One of the only prevailing commonalities is most of the utilized units appear to be from the newly-formed ‘Leningrad Military District’.

This panicked cris de coeur by a Ukrainian 57th Brigade account even lists the now legendary ‘Storm-Z’ penal troops as participating, while also naming the Ukrainian 125th territorial defense troops as abandoning their positions in Volchansk to flee:

It was likewise already confirmed by other Ukrainian military accounts that the AFU was forced to withdraw much-needed units from the Avdeevka and Chasov Yar fronts to reinforce the worsening Kharkov direction:

The first consequences of the breakthrough of Russian troops into the Kharkov region. Military chronicles report that the Ukrainian Armed Forces withdrew part of the units of the 42nd Mechanized Infantry Brigade from the front near Chasov Yar and hastily transferred Troops to Volchansk, fearing further expansion of the bridgehead and the introduction of larger Forces of the Russian Armed Forces.

As well as Forbes:

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2024/05/12/ukraines-cv90-fighting-vehicles-are-rolling-into-vovchansk-their-crews-expecting-a-russian-invasion-from-the-north/

The dilemma, for Ukrainian leaders, is that a feint can turn into an offensive with little notice—as long as the Russians can spare the forces from their operations in the east. “It is a shrewd approach, considering Ukraine's manpower constraints,” Finnish analyst Joni Askola wrote.

The Ukrainian military isn’t taking chances. Elements of several brigades, including the 59th Motorized Brigade and the 92nd Assault Brigade, are already in Vovchansk—or on the way. Notably, the 92nd Assault Brigade is bringing its best CV90 infantry fighting vehicles.

Ukrainian commander in chief Oleksandr Syrskyi insisted his troops would deploy and redeploy to match the Russians’ moves. “We are aware of the enemy's plans and can respond flexibly to all of his actions,” Syrskyi said.

Meanwhile, AFU sources themselves report that Russia only started off utilizing 7% of its regional forces, subsequently increasing it to 15%—which should give an idea of what’s yet to come:

Ukraine post: There is a lot of pressure on the boys. Deep is very difficult, Vovchansk is under control, but there are attempts to break through. The occupier is pulling more and more forces. If yesterday 7-8% of the total number of forces deployed in the operational area were involved, today it is up to 15%. A lot of enemy equipment was burned. But they will not stop until they are completely destroyed.

Here’s a visualization of the fights from one of the AFU units in the forests near Volchansk as they get shelled by Russian artillery:

Spokesman for Ukraine’s battlegroup Khortitsa, Nazar Voloshin, states Russia launched 22+ guided bombs on Volchansk today:

ISW also confirmed Russian advances and the AFU’s complaints:

There continue to be many other Russian advances on other fronts as well, but we can cover those next time.

---

Your support is invaluable. If you enjoyed the read, I would greatly appreciate if you subscribed to a monthly/yearly pledge to support my work, so that I may continue providing you with detailed, incisive reports like this one.

Alternatively, you can tip here: buymeacoffee.com/Simplicius

---