New CSIS Report Highlights Major Russian Drone and AI Restructuring
We return to the ongoing Ukrainian war series of premium articles wherein we examine the current developments in a broader, holistic fashion, rather than Sitrep-style tactical play-by-play.
One of the reasons for this ongoing series is because the Ukrainian conflict has been clearly undergoing some kind of slow epochal shift, and it is our duty to try and understand this evolution as thoroughly as possible, which cannot be done in a single article.
We kick off with an interesting new discussion by ex-commander-in-chief Zaluzhny about the current state of the conflict:
The post goes as follows:
General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, former Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and current Ambassador to the UK:
Due to scientific and technological progress, it has become impossible, regardless of what others may claim, to carry out operational-level tasks. 1/12An operational task is not a fight for two houses or even for a small town over the course of a year. Operational execution means achieving large-scale results within a short period of time, advancing 150, 200, even 250 kilometers. 2/12
Today, that is no longer possible. Because of technological developments, such outcomes are effectively unattainable. 3/12
Claims about major territorial gains today sound unrealistic, almost impossible under current conditions, except perhaps through fully automated, machine-driven means. 4/12
But the same constraints apply to Russia. They cannot concentrate forces or form a decisive strike group capable of rapid, deep advances. Technically, this is no longer feasible. The battlefield has become transparent. Anyone who appears is detected and targeted. 5/12
The war has reached a kind of deadlock, a zugzwang, for both sides. What happens at the front line is important, but it is not decisive. More important is what happens beyond the so-called kill zone, across the broader depth of the country, extending to the western borders. 6/12
Note what he says up to this point: that in the new paradigm of warfare in Ukraine, it is no longer the frontline that is most significant, but rather everything that happens elsewhere.
This is why his assertion that the war itself is at a “deadlock” is nonsensical: he’s referring—whether he realizes it or not—merely to the frontline aspect of it. Russia clearly possesses all the escalatory leverage and main strike disparities in this one category most of all, given Russia’s incomparably greater long-range capabilities.
This is a point I myself have been making for a while now. That the war has many different dimensions, and propagandists or ideologues like to focus only on the one dimension which gives their arguments credence at any given time. If the frontline aspect happens to be going slightly better than usual for Ukraine—i.e. they’re not losing land as quickly as they normally do—then they redefine the entire war to revolve around territorial capture. If the economic aspect is what’s giving them the most mileage—i.e. Russian oil being hit—then they use that to redefine the war’s trajectory as if that is the most crucial component that defines victory or defeat.
In reality, war encompasses every single aspect simultaneously, and in all of them Russia holds the vast superiority: politically, economically, in manpower terms, equipment, casualties, etc. There are only some niche drone and tactical ISR-related aspects of the technological sphere where Ukraine can be argued to hold a few advantages, but of course Russia still holds the overall technological edge, given its preponderance of aerospace, ballistic, aerial, naval, and other advantages.
But this is elementary stuff: everyone knows that war encompasses all these categories—Zaluzhny’s point is more specific than that. He’s saying now, more than ever before, the other categories hold even more weight compared to merely what happens on the frontline. In essence, he’s quietly admitting that Russia’s shifting strategy is a smart one: we learned in the last piece, that Russia appears to have de-prioritized the strictly territorial-tactical frontline gains for these other wider aspects of the broader war.
He goes on:
What we are witnessing is a large-scale technological revolution—first and foremost driven by the rise of artificial intelligence. This is the key game changer that will shape the future global order. 7/12
At the same time, it remains difficult to predict what that order will actually look like. It is hard to think like a futurist in this context because, so far, there is no clear leader in this technological race—no single actor around which a new system could consolidate. 8/12
What is emerging instead are potentially dangerous ideas. Many are familiar with Elon Musk and discussions around so-called “techno-fascism.” 9/12
In simplified terms, this points to a possible future where a small number of extremely powerful technology companies exert outsized control over global systems.
If translated into the military domain, this logic becomes even clearer. 10/12From a purely operational perspective, it may take only a handful of highly capable private actors to enforce order in a technologically advanced environment, effectively shaping control within an increasingly digital battlespace. 11/12
In this sense, the future world order will largely depend on how states and societies navigate this technological leap. 12/12
We mentioned last time that Russia is also using the lull to rejig its entire armed forces toward a drone-forward force. Primarily, this is being done by massively expanding the new Unmanned Systems Forces, which was officially established almost exactly six months ago.
This segues with the latest coverage from CSIS (Center for Strategic & International Studies), which recently released the following report on Russia’s ongoing drone warfare revolution:
The main theses of the report with our editorial points:
