Negotiations Fever Strikes Again as Trump's "Deadline" Hits Midnight
Another week, another new ‘peace summit’ shrouded in the spume of uncertainties, exaggerations, illusions and delusions alike. Without rehashing every irrelevant detail, we can summarize the developments in a few short breaths: Putin and Trump allegedly made plans to meet, but rumors suggest Trump’s agreement is contingent on Putin also meeting Zelensky, whereas Putin has just stated again—unequivocally—that a Zelensky meeting is “very far away”, given that many conditions would first have to be met:
Trump, afterwards, quickly denied the Zelensky claim, throwing even more confusion into the mix. Putin aide Ushakov tried to clear some of it up:
Polish outlet Onet made buzz with a claimed ‘leak’ of the US peace offer, which included de facto recognition of captured territory, lifting of sanctions, but no promises against Ukraine joining NATO. However, this was quickly shot down by one of Zelensky’s advisors:
Others now believe the Putin-Trump meeting will again focus more on US-Russian bilateral relations, rather than specifically on the Ukraine war. As always to front-load the information field, other outlets streamed out all sorts of ancillary rumors, including that Russia has agreed to an ‘air truce’ as a kind of gesture of goodwill, which would put a stop to both drone and missile strikes against Ukraine now carried out nightly.
Though the likelihood is high that most such rumors are fake, it would not be a particularly unrealistic maneuver for Russia in this case. It’s a very low cost way to signal political goodwill while simultaneously restocking drones and missiles for a brief period. Not striking Ukraine for a week or two would not have major effect on the overall timeline of Ukraine’s military incapacitation, but would allow Russia to replenish stocks so that when the ceasefire inevitably ‘breaks down’, Russia can resume with another major round of hefty attacks without digging too deeply into stockpiles.
We can understand the latest impetus for another big PR summit as follows: Trump needed a way to rescue himself from writing checks his mouth can’t cash. His blustery sanctions “deadline” is coming up, and after crunching the numbers and toeing the waters, he realized it’s not going to work out the way he planned.
Even India began resisting in ‘alarming’ ways, highlighting a critical risk to US-Indian relations:
Almost immediately came the news that Russia and India signed a document on expanding industrial and technological cooperation-such a response to Trump. In addition, India immediately suspended the purchase of six additional basic patrol aircraft P-8I, today.
As such, it’s probable that Trump needed a way to rescue himself from his own self-imposed ‘deadline’ trap and the way to do that was to generate another spectacle that could be sold as “major progress” by verbal-equilibrists like Marco Rubio.
It’s difficult to take Trump’s sincerity seriously, though, given that his admin just posted a new bulletin which names Russia as an ‘extraordinary threat’ to the United States:
Trump: "I have received additional information from various senior officials on, among other things, the actions of the Government of the Russian Federation with respect to the situation in Ukraine. After considering this additional information, among other things, I find that the national emergency described in Executive Order 14066 continues and that the actions and policies of the Government of the Russian Federation continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States."
Such hostility certainly does not evoke a sense of simpatico reconciliation.
Both sides strive to string along their own politically expedient interests; in Russia’s case, it’s important to convey the savor of peace-seeking and political agreeability while continuing to fulfill geopolitical and military imperatives; in the US’ case, it’s about up-keeping Trump’s aura of power and leadership, both for his own ego’s sake, and to placate political opponents, critics, and neocons alike who seek either a ‘tougher’ stance on Russia, or at least the ending of the war on terms favorable to Ukraine and the Western deep state—which is to say, an indefinite ceasefire which allows Ukraine military continuity, to restock and rebuild for an eventual round two.
The only dash of hope to the contrary of the above, rather pessimistic, appraisal was Rubio’s adjacent statement that the US has finally begun to “better understand” the contours of Russia’s chief demands:
But it’s easy to argue this still means nothing given the fact that some of Russia’s demands are complete non-starters for Ukraine, particularly demilitarization and presumably the withdrawal from the entirety of the Kherson and Zaporozhye regions, which includes their capital cities; thus, it’s hard to imagine things going anywhere at all.
That said, Ushakov’s comment that the US has made some offers ‘acceptable’ to Russia is interesting, though this may pertain to more the bilateral US-Russian rapprochement rather than SMO-specific concessions.
One could reasonably argue that part of the new upswell in negotiations fever has something to do with the fact that three or four major Ukrainian cities—depending how you count them—are close to being checkmated: Pokrovsk-Mirnograd, Konstantinovka, and Kupyansk, with perhaps Seversk not far behind. If their fronts collapse at close intervals, it could spell major political doom in Ukraine, a situation which understandably requires rescue by diplomatic means, as we’re seeing now.
So, will Trump “extend” his so-called deadline for Russian sanctions based on some kind of ‘fruitful’ meeting with Putin or will he cave to pressure either way? Additional front-running articles are claiming Trump will launch the ‘secondary sanctions’ either way, but that doesn’t necessarily mean anything if they’re short-lived and designed to appease neocons, before being quickly reversed, as has so often happened with Trump’s many impulsive demarches.
One thing is for certain, if Trump and Putin meet, Trump will no longer enjoy the excuse of not understanding Russian demands—he and his administration have played dumb for too long when it comes to that. Putin will relay his demands as directly as possible, with no more middlemen or telephone games—and Trump will lose his cover of ‘blissful ignorance’, and will be forced to act decisively against Zelensky and Ukraine, if he actually wants to move the needle toward ending the conflict.
A new CNN piece gives five potential outcomes for the war’s end:
The first:
1. Putin agrees to an unconditional ceasefire
They denote this one as “highly unlikely”, explaining that Russia is finally turning its gains into strategic advantages, which gives it no incentive to call it quits without good reason:
It’s improbable that Putin would agree to a ceasefire in which the front lines stay as they are – the United States, Europe and Ukraine already demanded such a pause in May, under the threat of sanctions, and Russia rejected it.
The Kremlin is currently turning incremental gains on the front line into strategic advantages and would see no point in stopping this progress now, as it reaches its height. Not even the threat of secondary sanctions against China and India – who appear resistant to US pressure – will change that immediate military calculus for the remainder of the summer. Until October, at least, Putin will want to fight because he is winning.
The second possibility:
2. Pragmatism and more talks
This one is bizarre, and appears designed merely to deflect attention away from the more dire and realistic outcome. They explain that Putin will fight until the winter freeze, admitting that Pokrovsk, Konstantinovka, and Kupyansk may all fall by then. The problem is, I already explained previously Russia makes some of its greatest gains during winter, when Bakhmut, Avdeevka, and the entire SMO in general were all launched.
3. Ukraine somehow weathers the two years ahead
This is the first somewhat reasonably realistic one, though still not convincing—though at least now they’re trying:
In this scenario, US and European military aid to Ukraine helps them minimize concessions on the front line in the coming months, and leads Putin to seek to talk, as his military have yet again failed to deliver. Pokrovsk may fall and other eastern Ukrainian strongholds may be threatened, but Ukraine could see the Russian advance slow, as it has before, and the Kremlin could even feel the bite of sanctions and an overheating economy.
European powers have already formulated advanced plans for a “reassurance force” to be deployed to Ukraine as part of security guarantees. These tens of thousands of European NATO troops could sit around Kyiv and other major cities, providing logistical and intelligence help to Ukraine as it rebuilds, and create a sufficient deterrent that Moscow decides to leave the front lines as they are. This is the very best Ukraine can hope for.
After dispensing with the cope, they arrive at the most plausible outcome:
4. Catastrophe for Ukraine and NATO
Putin could correctly see the cracks in Western unity after a summit with Trump that improves US-Russian relations but leaves Ukraine to fend for itself. Europe could do their utmost to back Kyiv, but fail to tip the balance without American backup. Putin could see small gains in the east of Ukraine transform into the slow rout of Ukrainian forces in the flat, open terrain between the Donbass and the central cities of Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia and the capital. Ukrainian defenses could prove weak, and Kyiv’s military manpower crisis turns into a political disaster when Zelensky demands wider mobilization to prop up the country’s defense.
Kyiv’s safety looks in peril again. Putin’s forces move forwards. Europe’s powers assess it would be better to fight Russia in Ukraine than later inside actual European Union territory. But Europe’s leaders ultimately lack the political mandate to join a war for land inside Ukraine. Putin moves forward. NATO fails to deliver a unified response. This is Europe’s nightmare, but is already the end of a sovereign Ukraine.
Not to leave their readers in total despair, they throw in a laughable sop as the fifth option, to sandwich reality between two kinder delusions:
5. Disaster for Putin: a repeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan
They write that Russia could face a repeat of the Afghanistan ‘rout’ after economic and societal pressures build up and Putin faces revolt at home. Well, it’s perhaps a very remote possibility, but certainly not any time in the near to medium term future. Perhaps by 2030 or beyond—but one must ask themselves: what kind of domestic situation will Ukraine be in by then? Secondly, unlike in Afghanistan, any Russian cessation of hostilities would still see massive gains of new territories incorporated into Russia forevermore.
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Another new CNN article makes an interesting admission, which segues us into the battlefield coverage portion of the report. They confirm my own theory from last week, that Russia’s recent targeting of the Korabel island of Kherson could likely be a setup for a Russian landing on there, which would be a springboard for a future full-on recapture of Kherson city proper.
The capture of Kherson city and region…remains one of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s main goals for the conflict, and the renewed pressure to separate Korabel from the rest of the city has raised concerns Russian forces might seek to bombard and then land upon the flat terrain in the weeks ahead.
A reminder, here is the besieged island which serves as gateway to the city itself:
It is now being entirely evacuated, and Russians have been bombing the only bridge to the island (there is one other one, but it is a railway-only bridge).
They have hit this Ostrovsky bridge again earlier today, but miraculously it continues to stand:
There are now even reports that Ukraine moved a Patriot system there to intercept Russian Su-34s flying bombing sorties to the bridge. Earlier in the day, a Ukrainian report claimed such an Su-34 was even shot down, but Russian sources clarified that several Patriots were fired but did not hit anything.
There are continued claims that Ukraine’s grouping here is gutted and being sectionally decimated by Russian drones, which—if true—would seem to suggest a future operation could be viewed as feasible by Russian command.
There were no major captures these past few days, but Russian forces continued to put the stranglehold on Pokrovsk and Kupyansk. In Pokrovsk, Rybar has geolocated advanced Russian DRGs to the city center, though much of the lower half of the city is essentially a big gray zone:
There seems an odd situation around the entire Pokrovsk region that we haven’t quite seen before, where Russian DRGs are operating particularly far behind enemy lines, which suggests very thinned out Ukrainian defenses. This is also the case north of Mirnograd, where Russian DRGs were reportedly spotted as far as Zolotai Kolodyoz (Golden Well), which as you can see is far beyond the current front:
This was corroborated on some Ukrainian channels:
There are also continued reports of Russian infiltration of Rodinske but nothing concrete yet.
There are other reports from top Ukrainian military channels concerning the situations further north.
Top Ukrainian analyst Myroshnykov comments on the deterioration of the Seversk front:
The situation in the Siversk area is escalating.
After losing Verkhniokamyanske as well, the enemy has approached the city to a distance of 2 km from the southeast.
In the Serebrianske forestry, the enemy is gradually pushing out our units. And this strongly affects Siversk.
Fighting is still ongoing in Hryhorivka, but there is almost no control over either the territory or the situation.
If this village falls, the defense of the southeastern part of the Serebrianske forestry will become impossible.
And then the enemy will concentrate on capturing the villages of Serebrianka and Dronivka, which will form pincers from the north and east of Siversk.
In Konstantinovka they report the situation is “critical” but not catastrophic despite that AFU forces are in “semi-encirclement”:
In the meantime, Kupyansk now looks like this, with Russian forces slowly enveloping the city and close to cutting one of the final main arteries to it from the western side:
You’ll note there is another main road that goes south, but it runs into Russian held territory. Therefore the only truly free MSR is the one running west. Some reports have even claimed Russian DRGs have likewise reached city center, though this is much more speculative at this point:
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A few last items:
Some Ukrainian reports claim Russia has seen an uptick in Su-57 usage over Ukraine, with the planes reportedly even flying directly over the front into Ukraine air defense zones:
This comes amidst rumors that the Su-57 is being equipped with Zircon hypersonic missiles:
I say “rumors” because the MOD reportedly announced the Su-57s are being equipped with some “hypersonic” weapon, but did not specify what it was. In truth, some new air-launched hypersonic missile was being designed specifically for the Su-57, and many people merely assumed it would be a ‘modified’ Zircon, but no one yet knows for sure what it is.
Personally, I don’t see how it would be the Zircon given that it’s a massive ship-launched 30-foot+ missile and the Su-57’s internal bays are 14ft long. That would presumably mean it would need to be carried outside the plane, which would negate its stealth features.
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Frankfurter Rundschau interestingly notes that the new Russian Geran drone is essentially the T-34 of the new war:
❕ New jet "Geran" drones — the legendary T-34 on the modern battlefield, report German media
The Frankfurter Rundschau notes that Russia is using new "Geran" jet drones on the front lines, which paralyze Ukrainian air defenses and sow panic among the Ukrainian Armed Forces. According to the authors, the role of these drones could become as iconic for the conflict as the legendary T-34 was in World War II.
The new turbojet "Gerans" reach speeds of up to 600 km/h and fly at altitudes up to 9,000 meters. They are launched simultaneously with turboprop analogs and decoys to completely disorient the enemy's air defenses. The number of drones used in a single raid is constantly increasing.
"Russia will continue strikes until it achieves the complete destruction of Ukrainian air defenses," the publication emphasizes.
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The US Marine Corps has created a groundbreaking new solution against Russian fiber-optic drones. Prepare to laugh, or cry, as it were:
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Lastly, Madam Rot brazenly imputes her own diseased regime’s callous tyranny onto Russia by gaslighting her peons that they are “free” and in Russia would be arrested for protesting, all while her jackboots collar someone for just that right in front of her:
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My god, that video of a protester being arrested in Finland... whoo. You either have to laugh or you cry.
Trump has bipolar policy disorder. On the one hand, he says, "drill baby, drill", then he threatens to push the price of oil down $10 bucks to hurt Putin. Trumpster wants it both ways by lying his way in and out of situations and coming up with stupid, unrealistic ideas. The Trump doctrine is no more than a bipolar policy disorder.
https://www.zerohedge.com/energy/russias-economy-stinks-drop-energy-prices-will-make-putin-stop-killing-people-trump-says